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Cover: Battista Angolo del Moro Vision of the Holy
Family Near Verona, c. 1581, oil on canvas.
This painting, referred to in the article by Jill Pelaez
Baumgaertner, is part of the Kress Study Collection of
the Allen Memorial Art Museum, Oberlin College,
Oberlin, Ohio. It is reproduced here with their very
kind permission.
Notes about Poets"A Touch of Pentecost" (p. 31) is by PatJames, who
teaches composition at the University of Central
Florida and in her community of Maitland, Florida.
Her poetry has appeared in numerous poetry and literary magazines. She prefaces the poem with this
headnote, from Flannery O'Connor: Few have stared at
that [goodness] long enough to accept that its face too is
grotesque, is something under construction.
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INLUCETUA
Free and Easy and Comfortable

Could it be possible to invent anything more productive of happiness than a baseball game on a perfect spring
afternoon? Taking this question seriously, and ever
responsible when it comes to testing a hypothesis, I went
last week to Comisky Park for an afternoon game, in which
the Sox took on the Yankees. The temperature was about
72, with strong sunshine, a feature of the day not inconsiderably contributing to the pervasive sense of blessing in the
occasion, since we had experienced rain on every other day
of the week, and sleet on the day preceeding. The sunshine itself seemed like a miracle.
Baseball is one of the strongest evidences that God is
good. Yes, I know there are awful things: domes, rowdy
fans, ugly owners, designated hitters. And there are dull
games; they always happen when you have finally persuaded the friend who thinks baseball is boring to accompany
you to the park. That'll be the day when the score of 1-0
doesn't identify a pitching duel, just a game with one dumb
thing after another. Generally though, watching a baseball
game contains the perfect combination of action and nonaction, an almost endless balance point between tension
and ease, enough to make you believe in the possiblity of
really enjoying eternity.
I wouldn't claim to call myself a baseball fan. Fans
know statistics and remember all the players for a specific
team's roster from the year of its founding to the present.
Fans have visited all the ball parks, and know the distances
from homeplate to the centerfield fence in every one .
Little fans have collections of cards in strange receptacles
(our son kept his in an ammunition box that was his second-most prized possession for years) . Big fans keep their
collections in plastic cases, and can always tell you, with
tears in their eyes, the moment they traded away the
Roberto Clemente that would have let them retire to
Sarasota at age 45. I never have had baseball cards, and
can scarcely remember the first inning of a game I'm
watching by the time of the seventh inning stretch. When I
try to think of the name of that guy I never liked, who
played right field for the Cubs in the mid seventies, it takes
me all day to remember "Bobby Murcer!" Nevertheless, I
love the game.
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Watching a game on television makes a perfect occasion for quilting, which might seem odd unless you are a
lover of process. And nothing makes an academic feel
more 'on vacation' than being able to come home early
from the office, fix a sandwich, and turn on the tv to catch
Steve Stone doing the Lead-Off Man show. I'm not the
kind of traditionalist who resents night games, because
democracy has its demands, and not everybody is lucky
enough ·to be able to take in a day game. Nonetheless,
watching a game in the middle of the day still has for me
the delicious sense of escape, holiday and escapade that
made Huck love the raft. ''You feel mighty free and easy
and comfortable at a day game."
But what compares to that moment, both literally and
metaphorically dazzling, when you come through the concourse archway and out into the light, the field brightest
green, the organ whining away underneath the noises of a
large, happy crowd of people! Before a ball game, the
world is all possibility-and this is even true at Cubs games.
At the park, not restricted to the endless trio of
pitcher/ batter/ catcher which the screen presents, you can
watch the fielders, and track somebody like Ron Cey or
Jose Vizcaino or even Lloyd McClendon while he moves
through the limitless permutations of waiting for a ball to
come his way. "Active and watchful" the hymn says, and
those words always remind me of third basemen. Anybody
who works in an institution, where an action has to be proposed, considered, analyzed, debated, and finally implemented by endless layers of groups of people, will revel in
watching a third baseman or a shortstop make a decision
and implement it in the time it takes you to hear the smack
of the bat. Wow! whadda stop!
I hope you enjoy this issue of The Cresset. I'm going
home to watch a game, and I might watch one tomorrow
too.
Peace,
GME
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REREADING JOHN DONNE:
THE ART OF TROMPE-L'OEIL

Jill Pehiez Baumgaertner
I.

I fell in with John Donne when I was an
undergraduate. I loved his cynicism, his sexiness, and his
monumental faith struggles. I loved the sheer difficulty of
his verse, its ambiguity, and the paradoxes he developed so
wittily. In Donne's work I could be assured of finding good
material for the ubiquitous poetry explications my
professors seemed to want in such prodigious quantities.
As a literature student of the sixties, I knew how to create
close readings of poetic texts. At that time students at most
American universities were taught by professors whose
literary bible was still Cleanth Brooks' and Robert Penn
Warren's Understanding Poetry, a textbook whose
underlying pedagogy was based on the autogenous tenets
of the New Criticism. The New Critics, who insisted on the
reader's objective stance before the text and who
attempted to sever texts from biographical, historical, and
political contexts, claimed that their approach to the
interpretation of poetry was a neutral, value-free
enterprise. In recent years a few voices have countered this
claim, accusing these critics of teaching only the literary
texts that were conveniently accessible using New Critical
instruments and methodology . John Donne studies
burgeoned midcentury, some say, because as a white
Christian male intellectual, he appealed to the status quo
and wrote poems that were embraced by these New Critics,
many of whom were also Southern political conservatives.
These critics argued that paradox and ambiguity were
the sine qua non of great poetry. And of course that is just
what they found in the poetry of John Donne. The famous
sonnet, "Batter my heart" is a case in point.

Jill Baumgaertner, of the Department of English at Wheaton
College, was for many years poetry editor for The Cresset. She has
written on Donne and Flannery O'Connor, and is the editor of an
anthology, Poetry, published by Harcourt, Brace, jovanovich.
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Batter my heart, three person'd God; for, you
As yet but knocke, breathe, shine, and seeke to mend;
That I may rise, and stand, o'erthrow mee,'and bend
Your force , to breake, blowe, burn and make me new.
I, like an usurpt towne, to'another due,
Labour to'admit you, but Oh, to no end,
Reason your viceroy in mee, mee should defend,
But is captiv'd and proves weake or untrue.
Yet dearely'I love you,' and would be loved faine,
But am betroth'd unto your enemie:
Divorce mee,'untie, or breake that knot againe,
Take mee to you, imprison mee, for I
Except you'enthrall mee, never shall be free ,
Nor ever chast, except you ravish mee.
This cry to God to respond with violence in order to claim
the speaker, even though such action may appear to be
against the speaker' s will, is one of Donne's most wellknown poems, based almost entirely on paradox: 'That I
may rise, and stand , o'erthrow mee. " "I / Except
you'enthrall mee, never shall be free ,/ Nor ever chast,
except you ravish mee." But anyone looking for a clear
and consistent theological viewpoint in this poem and in
many of Donne's Holy Sonnets will not find it. Richard
Strier presents a thorough and convincing argument that
many of these sonnets are simply not very good poems.
Rather than presenting a cohesive theological viewpoint,
Donne seems rather "a person who would like to be a
convinced Calvinist but who is both unable to be so and
unable to admit that he is unable to be so" (361). His
theological confusion seems even more marked here than
it is in his other spiritually oriented verse. Mixing bits and
pieces of Calvinist, Lutheran, Roman Catholic and
Anglican doctrine (seeming to understand, for example,
the Protestant doctrine of grace, but consistently denying
his assertions by unwittingly revealing contrary theological
positions) , Donne emerges from Strier's close readings of
the poem as a rather foggy theologian . The Reformation

The Cresset

position that humanity was helpless to save itself, that it
must remain a passive recipient of the gift of grace , is
represented by the beginning and ending paradoxes of the
poem. But the middle of the poem shows something else
entirely: a person who claims to be capable of the selfless
love of God. Strier is disturbed by the contradiction here,
and more disturbed by the stance of so many critics that
this type of contradiction is what makes Donne's poetry
great. In reality, the closer we examine Donne's verse, the
more we begin to see not just paradox and interesting
contradictions, but downright theological confusion.
We also sense the inadequacy and even the perversity
of the final paradox in which Donne uses rape as a
metaphor for God's grace: a free gift, undeserved, given to
a passive recipient. Here is the voice of the male
imperialist. "0 my America! my new-found-land," he cries
as he imagines his lady's disrobing in the elegy "Going to
Bed." A woman's body is to be mined, he suggests in other
poems. It should come as no surprise, then, to hear the
speaker of "Batter my heart" cry for rape as a sign of God's
power and authority over him. In other poems physical
domination has been a sign of his power over women. This
is not a poem a woman would ever have written, my female
students of the nineties point out to me, and I wonder why
this never occurred to us as we studied Donne in the
sixties. Then I remember that, as an undergraduate, I had
only one female professor. And besides , poems were
considered, more or less, contextless machines to be
dissected and then put back together again.
John Donne , as Dean of St. Paul ' s Cathedral ,
eventually became one of England's greatest preachers, but
his path to that position was circuitous, to say the least. We
don't know exactly who John Donne was before his
ordination, nor I posit, did he. Was he Catholic or
Protestant? Was he , along with his brother, guilty of
harboring a priest when such an activity was considered
treasonous? Or was he on the other hand the author of
virulent anti-Catholic tracts?
Some have concluded that
first Donne was Catholic, then he renounced Catholicism
and lived a hedonistic life for a while, and then he became
a Protestant, creating a neat chronological division
between his identities as Jack Donne, the womanizing rake,
and the Reverend Doctor John Donne, spiritual giant. This
is a false picture supported by those uncomfortable with
the ideas that one of England's greatest preachers could
have written scandalous love poetry and that he could have
accepted ordination as his only way in and up. But the fact
is that any ecclesiastical allegiance during those years was
also a political declaration.
The burden of Donne 's ancestry must have been
considerable if faithfulness to family tradition meant
May 1994

anything at all to him. His grandmother was a niece of
Thomas More. His Jesuit uncle, Jasper Heywood, who may
have served as tutor to Donne and his brother Henry, was
convicted of treason and condemned to be hanged, drawn
and quartered when Donne was twelve. Henry himself
died in prison before he came to trial for harboring a
priest.
Donne's most recent biographer, John Carey,
dramatizes the agony of Donne's choice to leave the
Catholic church by pointing out that his apostasy meant, in
the eyes of the Church, certain damnation. Many have
concluded that Donne "chose hell" in return for a chance
at courtly preferment and many have questioned Donne's
motives in writing and publishing works like his 1610
Pseudo-Martyr, in which he argues that in spite of fierce
recusant arguments to the contrary, Catholics should take
the Oath of Allegiance to King James. At times Donne
appears to be a politically ambitious individual who would
renounce his own faith, his family, and even his most loyal
patron in return for the attention of well-connected social
superiors, including, of course, the King.
Donne's struggle with and against the Roman
Catholic Church had been spread over many years, and his
renunciation of the faith into which he had been baptized
was a gradual process. It is difficult to trace the
development of Donne's thinking through the first thirty
or forty years of his life since the dates of most of his
poems are so speculative. We do know, however, that by
1597 and his twenty-fifth birthday, Donne had become
secretary to Thomas Egerton, himself an apostate. In 1601
Donne lost his position and with it any hope for future
preferment when he committed the unforgivable sin of
eloping with Sir Thomas' sixteen-year-old niece. This
private act led essentially to his exile from the public arena
and from any possibility of future political appointments.
It should come as no surprise, then, that Donne's
poems provide a remarkable study of ambivalence and
indecision that seem to lie just underneath the surface of
his assertions. In fact, he often seems to be developing
double attitudes, sometimes revealing contradictory
feelings. Of all of the seventeenth-century metaphysical
poets, John Donne, because of his often indeterminate
stance, creates the most problematic texts. Even if one
concludes that Donne's stance is discernible, consistent,
and unitary in a particular poem, the same conclusions are
not necessarily true for the next few poems. In reading
Donne, one must constantly begin again.

II.
In the late sixteenth century an Italian artist
completed a trompe-l'oeil painting in which he used visual
5

trickery to draw viewers into the depiction of a miraculous
event. The effect of his odd juxtaposition of the genre of
illusion and the subject of religious mystery is to render his
own stance ambiguous and to dislocate the viewer. A Vision
of the Holy Family near Verona by Battista Angolo del Moro
depicts a pastoral landscape with expanses of a twilit sky,
Verona's walls spreading against hills and fields, shepherds
herding their flocks, a traveller resting, and the filmy
apparition of Mary, Joseph, the Christ Child and John the
Baptist spread out against the evening sky. (See cover)
What captures the viewer's immediate attention, however,
before the vision itself, are the strange visual effects. The
top edge of the canvas appears to peel away and roll down,
revealing another canvas underneath, depicting the same
scene, suggesting either that the two canvases are perfect
replicas of each other or perhaps even that the top canvas
is a transparent veil through which much of the visionlandscape of the bottom painting can be discerned. The
muted colors of the top canvas contrast with the brighter
tones in the canvas underneath where the figures are much
less shrouded. Perhaps the artist is suggesting that life in
the material realm where spiritual reality is apprehended
"through a glass darkly" is nothing more than a shadowy
echo. Jane E. Connell and William Kloss, in their book
More Than Meets the Eye, have proposed that the "more
substantial" appearance of the images in the bottom canvas
imply that "the substance of reality is that which lies within,
hidden."
This Renaissance example of trompe-l'oeil breaks all of
the standard rules of deception. That this genre even has
such rules might be surprising to those who assume that in
the art of illusion the artist has been freed from standard
expectations. But the human eye is not so easily deceived,
and in order to counter the effects of a viewer's evervigilant rational nature, the artist of illusion must learn
certain basic techniques which help not to accentuate but
to obliterate the distinctiveness of the painted canvas or
fresco from reality. Trompe-l'oeil requires, to begin with, lifesize representation, a rule which a landscape, especially of
this magnitude, dramatically defies. For this reason, the
still-life is a more promising subject for trompe-l'oeil than a
landscape, especially one such as this containing human
and animal figures, which require the illusion of depth. An
additional requirement is that everything in the painting
must be represented whole; in other words, nothing in the
trompe-l'oeil painting should be cut off by the edges of the
canvas as described by Milman in Trompe-L'oeil Painting: The
Illusions of Reality.
A Vision of the Holy Family near Verona, which presents
a landscape with human and animal figures and an
apparition which is abruptly sliced through the center by
the edge of one. of the canvases, is allowed these
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divergences from the standard rules of illusory art because
of its identity as a repoussoir, a painting which is actually a
trompe-l'oeil of a painting. Reinforcing this effect is the
presence of another device, the cartellino, a slip of paper
that appears to be attached to the bottom center of the top
canvas. The cartellino is the artist's "signature,"
announcing his controlling presence, the date and the
place. In this case it reads:
VERONA
Fatta nel monasterio
Santo Angolo
N 1581
[Verona/ Made in the Monastery/ Santo Angolo/ Year 1581]

The cartellino presents a third plane within the painting,
creating a tiered effect, suggesting that the artist, who is
able to apprehend a spiritual reality which ordinary mortals
can see only dimly, is the self-conscious creator of the
vision, maybe even the creator of the spiritual dimension
itself. In other words, the artist considers himself much
more than a vehicle for the representation of spiritual
truths; the implication is that the artist actually creates the
truths themselves. Of course, in one sense, as a painter,
that is exactly what he does with brush and pigment. But
one suspects that in this case the artist is claiming much
more: that he is involved in the process of creating the
spiritual realm itself, a daring idea even in Renaissance
humanistic thought. Whose vision is depicted on this
canvas? No figure in the painting seems remotely aware of
the vision that has spread so dramatically across the sky.
Only the artist can claim this vision as his own. He has
placed himself in the third plane-that of the cartellino,
where he names himself both as maker and as the place that
the painting was made. He has changed the name of the
monastery from the correct "Santo Angelo" to "Santo
Angolo," his own name. The implication is more than
Platonic: by looking inside himself, Angolo del Moro has
been able to find the transcendent. The painting has been
made inside him, Angolo. But even more audacious is the
appellation Santo, which must have seemed a dangerously
presumptuous title for a young artist to give himself.
Sixteenth-century Verona was not Lutheran Germany or
Protestant England where "saint" could be used in its
Reformation context to refer to any believer in Christ.
"Saint," in sixteenth-century Italy, referred very particularly
to one who had been officially canonized by the church or
who lived a holy life of miraculous good works. It was
certainly not a title one conferred on oneself. Yet
embedded in the cartellino is the hint that Battista Angolo
del Moro might have no such compunctions. Notice,
however, that these are merely implications, suggestions,
The Cresset

suspicions. The final reading is as ambiguous as the
subject of the painting itself. After all, the cartellino is itself
an illusion.

As for the vision, Connell and Kloss suggest that the
artist must have been painting a story from local lore and
legend, but they can find no evidence that this is the case.
The pastoral setting, the shepherds on the hill, the
descending darkness, seem to link this vision with the
angels' announcement of the Savior's birth to the
shepherds outside of Bethlehem (21, 33, n. 14). However,
trompe-l'oeil ordina~ily does not even pretend to present
story. After all, a genre engendered by trickery and illusion
would invite interpretations beyond those suggested by the
genre of simple narration, so if there are echoes here of
the Annunciation to the Shepherds, one is tempted to look
for ironies rather than straight representation. Zirka
Zaremba Filipczak notes that from 1550-1700, artists
portraying visions most often showed Mary holding the
Christ Child, as she does in Angolo Del Moro's painting.
He observes further that during this time, "a common
definition of 'vision' was 'what the blessed in heaven see,'
and indeed in most depictions of visions a bit of heaven
seems to have descended toward earth. Clouds frame the
sacred apparition, which radiates brilliant light" (197).
What exactly do these blessed heavenly figures-Mary,
Joseph, Christ and John-see? Do they see each other? Do
they look from the sky-canvas into the pastoral landscape
where no one meets their eyes? Do they look into the
artist's studio-or from the museum walls, do they see
beyond time and place to our own time and place? Their
view is indeterminate and vague. They seem to be looking
beyond each other, beyond the artist, beyond the viewer.
The vision, we have already determined, is the artist's. If a
vision is "what the blessed in heaven see,'' does this imply
that he identifies himself as one of heaven's blessed
bridging heaven and earth with his "inseeing"? Th~
message is ambiguous. By offering the vision to viewers, by
including them in the experience, is he encouraging their
belief or their doubt? Milman describes the dilemma of
the genre:
Through its many facets, trompe-l'oeil has always made its
intention perfectly clear. Its express purpose is to mystifY,
to transcend and replace the illusion of reality by its
certainty.... Even though trompe-l'oeil is meant to deceive
and in some cases very nearly succeeds, it is not always
accepted at once as a reality. At first sight the image comes
as a surprise. By turns it inspires doubt and certainty in a
continual readjustment of the gaze. The puzzled viewer is
torn between the message of his eyes and the message of his
brain. The mind may already know the right answer, and
yet the spectator's reaction is to abandon his receptive
passiveness and act in order to test what he sees. A 'relation
of uncertainty' is thus created between the image and the
May 1994

viewer, which makes the situation ambiguous and, in the
end, infinitely pleasant. The game may be a familiar one
for the knowing public who is aware of similar past
experiences. Then the very fact of knowing that the picture
was designed to arouse doubt enriches the contact with it
.... Each image in trompe-l'oeil thus amounts to a position
taken up by its creator with respect to the reality which he
represents; it is also, very often, an involuntary token of his
personality and preoccupations. (103)
The game may be intriguing, even pleasurable, but there is
an additional factor in the percipient's experience with A
Vision which makes it unsettling. The eye goes immediately
to the rolled edge of canvas bisecting the apparition, and
the oddest of the painting's effects can be attributed to the
the canvas edge which seems to slash through the middle
of the vision, literally "de-facing" two of the figures in it.
Mary and Joseph have eyes and chin, but no mouth or
nose. The artist cuts off the organs of respiration and
speech, distancing the spiritual realm he portrays in the
bottom .canvas even more dramatically from the rest of
creation-the shepherds, sheep, and traveller in the top
canvas, the artist whose name and place are on the
cartellino, and the viewer who stands at an even deeper
remove.
The effect is disturbing, and one is not sure if this is a
pleasant game involving the play of images in eye and
brain, or if it isn't perhaps something more foreboding.
Perhaps the artist is suggesting that any perceived
connections between the spiritual realm and the earthly
are illusory. Perhaps for us, the viewers, he is saying that it
is all just canvas and a play of light and shadow and that we
will never be sure what is real and what is not.
The more closely one considers this painting, the
more decentralizing it becomes. Where is the artist
standing exactly? What does he mean by painting in such
hieroglyphs? Does he have a vision or doesn't he? Does
the painting represent the intersection of the heavenly and
the earthly, or does it represent the primacy of the earthly
kingdom, spread out like Verona before us? Does the
painting suggest the complete inefficacy of the spiritual
realm, hidden as it is by an obscuring veil, cut off by the
obliteration of sacred identities and the adoption of the
sacred name by an artist whose bold claim is that he is the
creator? Does this painting fight, negate and contradict
any conclusion one offers? Does it offer several possibilities
simultaneously?
The interpretation of the vision portrayed in the
painting is thrust outward into a fourth plane, even the
fourth dimension-to those of us who stand outside of the
three levels of the painting, outside the time and place of
the maker. ~ with all successful examples of trompe-l'oeil,
viewers become aware that their own imaginations are
being challenged, and their involvement in the play offalse
7

perceptions becomes a part of the game.
The trompe-l'oeil painting's ludic quality has some
connections with the exaggerations, the riddles, and the
jarring effect of the seventeenth-century metaphysical
poem. Through sheer tenaciousness, the metaphysical
conceit, violently yoking together disparate elements,
forces readers to relinquish their natural resistance to a
comparison which is neither familiar nor reasonable.
Creating his own "world, made cunningly," the
metaphysical poet adopts a self-consciously witty persona,
and the reader willingly plays along, fascinated by the
tension between opposites and the tantalizing, though
seemingly impossible, promise of reconciliation.

III.
john Carey contends that in all aspects of his life
Donne was attracted to the tensions between irreconcilable
opposites. Carey acknowledges that there are many John
Donnes, and "anyone who takes him must take all of him"
(12). To look for consistency in Donne is to miss the point.
The dislocation of the reader is the point. We must learn
to accept our own unbalancing as a necessary part of the
experience of reading this work. But we must read with
our eyes open to the cultural, theological and political
inconsistencies in his verse in addition to indications that
in his poetry at least he never completely resolves his
problem of doctrinal allegiance.
In this context, rather than merely providing an
example of Donne's shocking metaphysical wit and
occasional bad taste, another of his sonnets, "Show me
deare Christ, thy spouse" seems oddly appropriate. The
dichotomy between Rome and the Reformers is presented
in the first few lines.
Show me deare Christ, thy spouse, so bright and cleare.
V\'hat, is it she, which on the other shore
Goes richly painted? or which rob'd and tore
Laments and mournes in Germany and here? (11. 1-4)

The church's identity, once so unmistakable, is now
uncertain: "Is she selfe truth and errs? now new,
now' outwore?" (1.6). Is she Catholic or Lutheran or
Anglican?
Doth she,'and did she, and shall she evermore
On one, on seaven , or on no hill appeare?
Dwells she with us, or like adventuring knights
First travaile we to seeke and then make love? (7-10)

The speaker's confusion leads him to the prayer of the
poem: Christ, reveal the true church to me because I
cannot discern it on my own. The poem fills with options,
8

not one of them "bright and cleare." Finally, that initial
image is completely displaced by the last four lines.
Betray kind husband thy spouse to our sights,
And let myne amorous soule court thy mild Dove,
Who is most trew, and pleasing to thee, then
When she'is embrac'd and open to most men. (11-14)

No matter how one reads these lines, they seem to be a
perversion of the spiritual eroticism of the Song of Songs.
Christ's spouse is not merely the "painted" Church of
Rome or the raped German church or its English
counterpart or the lethargic giant sleeping through the
Dark Ages or the fair lady to be won by competing knights.
The implication is unmistakable: Christ's "bright and
cleare" spouse does not exist in any of these forms. Her
actions are rather more akin to those of Hosea's Gomer
before her return and repentance. The final lines of the
poem suggest that the poet seems to have no sense of the
inappropriateness of his conclusion that the church is most
pleasing to Christ when she is acting like a whore. He
seems to shrug it off as simply another clever metaphor. He
seems strangely unaware of any potential problems.
The greatest obstacle in the way of clear and fresh
readings of Donne's poems is the interpretive tradition that
has already been established, a tradition which has ignored
some of the major flaws in his poetry and has even held up
some of its weaknesses as strengths. Anna Nardo stresses
Donne's "precariously balanced" position in the only place
play can occur: "Always locating himself in between, in
identities that are ambiguous, paradoxical, and defined by
nonbeing, Donne was a liminal man in a liminal age .... As
Donne precariously balanced his identity, his poetry and
prose dramatized for his contemporaries their experience
of liminality: an acute sensitivity to separation; a
preference for images of effacement, for paradox and
ambiguity; and the playful inversion, fragmentation, and
hybridization of cultural elements" (71). Nardo's
description of this experience of liminality also reminds
one of Battista Angolo del Moro's odd, playful, and
ambiguous posturings in A Vision of the Holy Family Near
Verona.
We read Donne's poems through the haze of time,
picking up hints here and there of his political aspirations,
his theological uncertainties, his spiritual highs and lows,
his attraction to ideas and his boredom with them, his
pruriences, his almost pathological avoidance of
commitment to a consistent point of view even while he
zealously pursued the attention of those in power. We
stand outside the frame, often wondering exactly where he
stands in these poems. He is, of course, "behind, before,
above, between, below," always imagining that he is acting,
The Cresset

even when he is not. Does this make him a good poet? Not
always. But the elements of strangeness in his verse, his
trickiness, and the puzzles he sometimes unwittingly
creates challenge us to attempt to define exactly what it is
we have seen in his poems. Tracing one theme through his
poetry requires an almost protean flexibility on the part of
the reader. Donne is the master magician. Now we see
him. Now we don't.
Thomas Hester has observed that 'Just where Donne
does stand is an inquiry that his works seem most often
poised to raise without answering" (368). Hester's thesis is
that Donne 's works are encoded with local meaningsreplete with references familiar to those most intimately
connected with the politics of religion in seventeenthcentury England. Hester is able to discern two voices at
work in many of Donne's poems-that of the Recusant and
that of the Protestant.
The Russian critic Mikhail Bakhtin refers to this use
of various languages in literary texts as polyglossia. Defining
language as a struggle between centrifugal and centripetal
forces, or between decentralizing and centralizing forces,
Bakhtin contends that "language is never unitary." It is,
instead, in continual dialogic relationship with
destabilizing factors. Heteroglossia is different from what
occurs among the multi-faceted meanings of an ordinary
symbol. Instead, it is the presence of different and distinct
voices in a literary text resulting in a "doublelanguagedness."
Discordia concors, a phrase which could be used to
describe the heteroglossia of Donne's texts, has long been
associated with the more superficial aspects of Donne's
poetry, suggesting that in his work the realistic, discordant,
fragmented and cynical stand side-by-side with the
idealistic, concordant, united and hopeful. As a voracious
reader, he was familiar with the polemical writings of all
sides in the religious controversies of his time. Could
Donne's unique style possibly be the result of the
conflicting langi1ages of the Renaissance and the
Reformation, movements which affected Donne in
personal ways throughout his life?
Language , as Donne uses it, is not, according to
Bakhtin's theory, unitary. It is constantly qualified by its
dialogue with the languages of recusant, apostate,
Anglican divine, patronage seeker, melancholy lover, and
political aspirant. Discordia concors describes both the
complexity and the confusion of Donne's verse. Harmony
stands in the Latin phrase as it does both thematically and
sonorously in Donne's poetry, but it is.a struggling
harmony, one which is frequently shattered by a fallen
world and by Donne's theological and political
ambivalences, and his insensitivities. Donne writes in The
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Second Anniversary, "Soule, to thy first pitch worke up
againe," knowing full well that such a task, essentially
recreating Eden, is impossible. Can what is fallen be raised
again? That is, of course, a basic theological question
which he continually attempts to resolve through reason,
and continually fails to resolve in any consistent manner.
But it is also a political question with autobiographical
implications for Donne, who in 1601 fell from political
grace. Can what is fallen ever be raised again? Would it
ever be possible for him to work himself up to his first
pitch, his prelapsarian state? Fourteen years later, Donne
accepted the reality that his most viable political choice was
to become an Anglican priest. And he followed James I's
lead. The King was interested in establishing a middle
ground in religion. Donne seemed after the same thing,
for personal aggrandizement, in his political posturings,
which very naturally included his religious position.
Because there was no real separation between religion and
politics, this middle ground was necessarily slippery, as are
any political and religious interpretations of his poetry. 0
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TRUTH TELLING, MEDIEVAL AND MODERN
Edward Uehling

After several years of teaching a freshman seminar
entitled Images of War, during which I deliberately avoided
including materials from the Vietnam war, I took the emotional risk of introducing one Vietnam novel into the reading list. For some time, I had been reading fiction, poetry,
and memoirs from Vietnam, and so it was clear enough to
me that one title couldn't miss-or, if it did , the fault
would be mine. It was Tim O'Brien's Going After Cacciato
and it worked. Reading literature of the war had been personally important because, having spent eleven months
and one day as a sort-of soldier in Vietnam, I needed a new
and less angry perspective: I needed to acknowledge that
what had happened to me had happened in various-often
tragic-forms to many other individuals, soldiers and civilians. I needed to be smarter about the war, which meant
exploring its contexts. I had to find a way of getting
beyond understanding to what I would call knowing and
believing. In short, I needed to learn how to play with it.
It has been a nice trip so far-so much fun, in fact,
that I've given it a title-''Vietnam is not Nebraska"-and
have had some success in writing about it. On another
occasion, I wou ld be glad to tell those stories, but today I
want to talk about story telling and to examine the texts
that led me on this chase. The first of these texts lurks in a
shadowy, unlikely place-my dissertation on medieval

Ed Uehling is just completing a twelve-year term as chair of the
Department of English. This lecture, originally given as his inaugural lecture as full professor, demonstrates his abiding interests in
literature, medieval and modern, and especially in literature as the
reflector and shaper of the best of human life.
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English cycle drama, specifically the Wakefield pageants.
The last appeared when Tim O' Brien wrote his most recent
novel, The Things They Carried: that book helped me begin
to make connections.
Anyway, it has occurred to me, somewhat circuitously,
that the impulse for storytelling in medieval meditation literature and in late medieval cycle drama has fruitful parallels to the impulse of Tim O'Brien for walking a tightrope
between fiction and nonfiction in his writing about the
Vietnam war. Despite clear differences in the formal
demands of each genre, each works against similar obstacles to arrive at new levels of intellectual, emotional, and
even spiritual authenticity. Perhaps the most difficult
obstacle for the anonymous writer of Meditations on the Life
of Christ, or the Wakefield Master, or Tim O'Brien is subject
matter so familiar that an audience may easily fall into
stereotypes or automatic, unthinking responses. Consider
the Meditations: an interest in the pathos of the Gospel
story, in the humanity of Christ, is at the heart of the book.
So clear is this focus that the Prologue, while it stresses the
Gospel as the proper basis for meditation, urges just as
strongly the necessity of the process itself.
Therefore the heart of one who wishes to follow and win Him
must take fire and become animated by frequent contemplation: illuminated by divine virtue, it is clothed by virtue and is
able to distinguish false things from true. Thus it is more the
illiterate and simple people who have recognized in this way
the greatness and intensity of divine things. (3)
Implicit is the conviction that, beyond the passive remem-
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brance of scriptural accounts heard or read, the act of
imagination leads one to a higher spiritual perception.
In outlining the aim of his meditations (and those he
encourages his audience to undertake), the writer endorses
a variety which expands our idea of truth:
It is possible ... to contemplate, explain, and understand the
Holy Scriptures in as many ways as we consider necessary, in
such a manner as not to contradict the truth of life and justice
and not to oppose faith and morality. Thus when you find it
said here, 'This was said and done by the Lord Jesus,' . .. if it
cannot be demonstrated by the Scriptures, you must consider
it only as a requirement of devout contemplation. Take it as if
I had said, 'Suppose that this is what the Lord Jesus said and
did . . ." (5, my emphasis)
Still, the full scope of such revisualization of the
Gospel story is not clear until the writer adds: "And if you
wish to profit you must be present at the same things that it
is related that Christ did and said, joyfully and rightfully,
lea,•ing behind all other cares and anxieties" (5). The call
to reconstruct imaginatively and add to the historical life of
Christ requires, in the broadest sense, dramatic composition. Individual readers must alter their consciousness of
presence and, transcending the mundane, recreate within
the Gospel framework scenes wherein they become participants. In doing so the one who meditates makes a leap in
time to what Auerbach, among others, refers to as an attitude of the "simultaneous present." Such a leap lends
integrity to the expression of vivid personal experience as
opposed to verifiable and generally held fact.
The degree of variation and its thrust sometimes produce startling images. For instance, the author scarcely
mentions the Sermon on the Mount because he knows one
might "look it up" and because he is far more engaged by
his idea of the disciples' human reaction to Jesus' teaching.
He focuses on what happens after the Sermon, when Jesus
speaks familiarly with them and "this group of simple people follows, not in careful, orderly fashion, but like chickens following the hen, so that they might better hear Him,
each one trying to come close to Him" (xxviii). That the
author is conscious of his sources, both in meditating and
then presenting his creation, is clear from the citation of
Matthew 5 in the heading for the episode, from his general summation of it, and from references to Augustine and
Bernard. That his vision is guided more by personal
insight than by doctrine is clear not only from the emphatic placement of the homely simile, but from his passing
comment that he employs only such texts and authorities
"as occur to me" (152). The writer is advocating what has
worked for him-he is the measure of the worth of the process-and the introspective nature of his meditation introduces a humanizing element. The event-seemingly unapproachable because of its historical distance in time, the
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magnitude of the figures in it, and the huge consequences
of its message for humankind-becomes more comprehensible, within reach, because of the particularity of familiar
detail at work in this reconstruction of it. Time has been so
manipulated in this conception of the Sermon on the
Mount and its telling that the meditation adds to the
Gospel story a sense of ongoingness, of applicability, not
possible before.
Early on, then, the writer of the Meditations identifies
his working aesthetic-"the devout belief of the imagination and the varying interpretation of the mind" (5). But if
his task is to address moments from all parts of Christ's life,
not all of the meditations will be pretty or comfortable.
Indeed, as he begins meditations on the Passion sequence,
the author offers this advice: 'To him who searches for it
[a new state of mind] from the bottom of the heart and
with the marrow of his being, many unhoped-for steps
would take place by which he would receive new compassion, new love, new solace, and then a new condition of
sweetness that would seem to him a promise of glory"
(320). Characteristically, the writer calls for fresh and
imaginative participation to bring about the "many
unhoped-for steps"-insisting that "[we] are present at
these things" and that "we must not be repelled at the
thought of them" (320).
Let me illustrate with an excerpt from a meditation
on the Buffeting in which we find sustained attention to
the abuse that Jesus endures-as a man at the hands of
other men.
But in what battle is He tormented? You will hear (and see) .
One of them seizes Him, (this sweet, mild, and pious Jesus),
another binds Him, another attacks Him, another scolds Him,
another pushes Him, another blasphemes Him, another spits
on Him, another beats Him, another walks around Him,
another questions Him, another looks for false witnesses
against Him, another accompanies the one that searches,
another gives false testimony against Him, another accuses
Him, another mocks Him, another blindfolds Him, another
strikes His face, another goads Him, another leads Him to the
column, another strips Him, another beats Him while He is
being led, another screams, another begins furiously to torment Him, another binds Him to the column, another
assaults Him, another scourges Him, another robes Him in
purple to abuse Him, another places the crown of thorns,
another gives Him the reed to hold, another madly takes it
away to strike His thorn-covered head, another kneels mockingly, another salutes Him as king. . . . He is led back and
forth, scorned and reproved, turned and shaken here and
there like a fool and an imbecile; like a thief and a most evil
malefactor He is led now to Annas, now to Caiaphas, now to
Pilate, now to Herod, and again to Pilate, now in, now out. 0
my God, what is this? Does this not seem a most hard and bitter battle? But wait a while and you will hear harsher things.
(318-19)
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It is an unencumbered sensibility-one "directed by the
whole light of the mind, by the eyes of the watchful
heart"-that accumulates such a layering of vivid detail.
Less formal in context and appealing to a wider audience, the Wakefield pageants more boldly and skillfully
encourage a full and immediate range of human responses. As part of a cycle of dramatic presentations of known
human history (that is, stories from the Old and New
Testaments), the Wakefield pageants aim for a balance of
familiarity and awe by blurring conventional distinctions of
audience and actors, of sacred and secular, and by dismissing linear causalhy for collective truth. Imagine, for
instance, that Cain and Abel live not within the clear borders of Genesis IV, but within the social context of resentment between a prosperous shepherd and a hard-luck
farmer; jealousy between an older man and his younger,
terminally cheerful brother; verbal and physical confrontation between a violent but ineffectual Cain and his insolent, apocryphal servant, Garcio. Imagine that the pageant
begins with Garcio, dressed like you and speaking directly
to you, demanding your silence-"let your lips cover your
teeth," he snarls, "or you can kiss the devil's ass 'till your
teeth bleed." Imagine that Cain, standing over his brother's body, addresses the audience directly and in the most
familiar language, thereby reminding us that we are all
sons and daughters of Adam and denying us intellectual or
emotional retreat. Hear Cain reject God's judgment as he
would God's blessing, and listen to his anachronistic oath
"by Christ's dear bones." You must be present.
Imagine, too, that each year your whole communityburgesses, tradesmen, and common laborers-view the
cycle of pageants. Not only have you have witnessed The
MU1·der of Abel before, you have understood its significance
individually and as part of a larger whole. Cumulatively,
Cain and Abel belong to a world in which our conception
of Noah's righteousness is tempered by his wife's skepticism over a husband's authority and by her remembrance
of all her friends, who have not been saved; in which Isaac,
despite God's saving intervention, can hardly wait to get
home from the place of sacrifice to see his mother; in
which Joseph, an old man with a young wife, is sure he has
been cuckolded and made a public fool. It is a world in
which English shepherds lament social injustice, complain
of physical discomfort, and comically repay a thief for stealing one of their sheep and trying to pass it off as a newborn
child: only then do the angels' voices guide them from
Horbury bog to Bethlehem. Yet that is only one of the possibilities, for there are two Shepherds' pageants, each creating a distinctive context in which the Christ child appears.
The world of Cain and Abel is also the end of a world. In
The Harrowing of Hell characters past, present, and future
appear; not surprisingly, the bad souls get most of the good
lines, and when a cheating ale wife is greeted by Lucifer as
"my darling dear," we enter a world as familiar as our corner tavern.
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I could go on, but you get the idea, I think, and we need to
visit a corner of Vietnam. It is not true that literature of
war, especially the Vietnam war, is as central to American
culture as Christian history was integral to the identity of
medieval English people. Nevertheless, Vietnam continues
to occupy a prominent place in our national consciousness;
some would argue that it remains an obsession. So perhaps
the first question to ask is this: how does The Things They
Carried fit with other fiction about the Vietnam war?
Let me answer indirectly. There is an enormous
quantity of the stuff: Philip Caputo, one of the important
writers in the genre, has counted more than one thousand
titles. Ten years ago, C. D. B. Bryan-himself the author of
Friendly Fire, a good piece of journalistic writing about the
mysterious non-combat death of a boy from Iowa-wrote
an interesting article for Harper's, "Barely Suppressed
Screams: Getting a Bead on Vietnam War Literature." It
attempts to distinguish literature about Vietnam from that
about the world wars. Though he focuses on the early fiction, Bryan offers an interesting outline of what he calls the
"Generic Vietnam War Narrative." Acknowledging that the
standard 365-day tour of duty in Vietnam has imposed a
particular narrative form, he suggests that "critics have
wondered whether conventional realism might be inadequate for conveying the moral and political ambiguities of
the war in Vietnam, and whether a new narrative strategy
might not be called for" (68-69).
By cheating only a very little bit, Bryan was prophetic.
That is, five years earlier, as Bryan knew perfectly well, Tim
O'Brien had won the National Book Award for Going After
Cacciatcr-a book in which reality in war is defined not
chronologically, but by an interweaving of memory and
imagination that takes the form of a quest. Nevertheless,
perhaps because it is hard for Bryan "to recall exactly which
incidents take place in which books" (68), his Generic
Vietnam War Narrative instructively captures an all-too
familiar pattern of artistic representation and public
response. In American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam John
Hellman makes a similar point in arguing that serious literature, as well as popular culture, often distorts or conceals
in an effort to express symbols of national consciousness.
How does O'Brien fit the pattern? Only sort of. The
Things They Carried bears almost no resemblance to Bryan's
generic narrative. However, this is not Tim O'Brien's first
book about Vietnam; it is his third. The shift in his scope
and narrative technique is worth noting. O'Brien's first-if
I Die in a Combat Zone, Box Me Up and Ship Me Home, a memoir-is realistic, descriptive of the day-to-day life of foot soldiers, and is at least occasionally chronological; it is like
much of the good early fiction written about the Vietnam
War. Cacciato, as I have said, belongs in a different, experimental category that includes several other provocative narratives-Larry Heinemann's Paco's Story and Gustav
Hasford's The Short-Timers among them. With The Things
The Cresset

They Carried O'Brien achieves an even greater distancing
from linear truth. It is a book of and about storytelling in
which Tim O'Brien, novelist, creates a central character by
the same name whom we are not allowed to regard as autobiographical. Among the half dozen major characters of
the book there are frequent periods of introspection and
feelings of separateness: although they may have great feeling for other soldiers, it is mostly internalized and, at
moments of combat crisis, typically unfolds in guarded,
careful language. O'Brien's aim is. not to represent the
experience of the Vietnam War, but to layer scenes of peoples' lives before, during, and long after the war. As he distinguishes between "story truth" and "happening truth," he
builds more than combat narratives.
Still, the second and third questions remain: why do
people tell war stories? Why and how do we listen? In an
interview, O'Brien gives us part of the answer: he says that
the attraction of all war fiction is "a built-in life and death
importance." The aesthetic difficulty, he adds, is "trying to
make credible what was personally incredible" (Publishers
Weekly 61). Beyond that tension lies the conviction that
such stories must be told and retold; that one can say
things twenty years after the mere historical fact that could
not be said before or even imagined; that because war stories are not just war stories, the investment is personally
and artistically worth the risk. For O'Brien, as for the writer of the Meditations and the Wakefield playwright, the process is everything.
The structure of the book suggests that O'Brien
anticipates the necessity of forcing us to look freshly at
familiar situations. The first chapter, which shares the
book's title, begins with a collage of details, a kind of naming of parts. Only after O'Brien acquaints us with the
numbing routine of "humping" and a catalogue of new language for a new world are we sufficiently acclimated to
regard ourselves as somewhat informed insiders who may
consider the beginnings of story lines. Imagine, for
instance, the connotative power of an expression such as
"tunnel vision" after one has searched tunnels. We will not
meet one-dimensional figures-the Sunday school Noah or
John Wayne; we will meet American adolescents, and we
will be invited to share their particular forms of dislocation.
As we become aware of O'Brien playing with his materials-building upon what has come before, extending consequences over time (a nearly medieval troping)-we
approach a balance of awe and familiarity like that accomplished by the Wakefield playwright. With it we may
become believers and, with our initiation, learn how to
laugh.
An early illustration of the technique occurs in the
fourth chapter, "On the Rainy River." In it the action
retreats to the summer before Vietnam when the narrator
has received his induction notice and whiles away the time
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at home in a paralysis of conscience. An interim job on the
disassembly line of a slaughter house finds our Phi Beta
Kappa powerhosing blood clots from hog carcasses,
smelling like pork chops, and feeling trapped. Without a
clear plan, the fictional Tim drives to the MinnesotaCanadian border, rents a cabin at an otherwise abandoned
fishing lodge. On his last day there, he is taken on a singular fishing trip on the Rainy River to within sight of the
Canadian shore. In a "sudden swell of helplessness," he
looks back at the Minnesota shore and has a vision-which
combines elements that will appear and reappear throughout the novel:
A hallucination, I suppose, but it was as real as anything I
would ever feel. I saw my parents calling to me from the far
shoreline. I saw my brother and sister, all the townsfolk, the
mayor and the entire Chamber of Commerce and all my old
teachers and girlfriends and high school buddies. Like some
weird sporting event: everybody screaming from the sidelines,
rooting me on-a loud stadium roar. Hotdogs and popcorn7stadium smells, stadium heat. A squad of cheerleaders
did cartwheels along the banks of the Rainy River; they had
megaphones and pompoms and smooth brown thighs. The
crowd swayed left and right. A marching band played fight
songs. All my aunts and uncles were there, and Abraham
Lincoln, and Saint George, and a nine-year-old girl named
Linda who had died of a brain tumor back in fifth grade, and
several members of the United States Senate, and a blind poet
scribbling notes, and LBJ, and Huck Finn, and Abbie
Hoffman, and all the dead soldiers back from the grave, and
the many thousands who were later to die-villagers with terrible burns, little kids without arms or legs-yes, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff were there, and a couple of popes, and a first
lieutenant named Jimmy Cross, and the last surviving veteran
of the American Civil War, and Jane Fonda dressed up as
Barbarella, and an old man sprawled beside a pigpen, and my
grandfather, and Gary Cooper, and a kind-faced woman carrying an umbrella and a copy of Plato's Republic, and a million
ferocious citizens waving flags of all shapes and colors-people in hard hats, people in headbands-they were all whooping and chanting and urging me toward one shore or the
other. I saw faces from my distant past and distant future. My
wife was there. My unborn daughter waved at me, and my two
sons hopped up and down, and a drill sergeant named Blyton
sneered and shot up a finger and shook his head. There was a
choir in bright purple robes. There was a cabbie from the
Bronx. There was a slim young man I would one day kill with
a hand grenade along a red clay trail outside the village of My
Khe. [But he finds himself unable to choose:] All those eyes
on me," he says, "-the town, the whole universe-and I
couldn't risk the embarrassment. (60-61)

Like many other chapters in the novel, it could stand on its
own, and like all the chapters, it is about war. But it is also
about larger issues of courage and decency and fear.
We would be well served, however, to consider what
Tim O'Brien, storyteller, points out about Tim O'Brien,
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character. Of the many examples, let me give three. In the
seventh chapter, "How to Tell a True War Story," our narrator says this: "In a true war story, if there's a·moral at all,
it's like the thread that makes the cloth. You can't tease it
out. You can't extract the meaning without unraveling the
deeper meaning. And in the end, really, there's nothing
much to say about a true war story, except maybe 'Oh'"
(84). A second illustration occurs in the final chapter, "The
Lives of the Dead." It juxtaposes the death of an old
Vietnamese man with the remembered death of a 9-yearold friend, Linda, from childhood. It begins, "But this too
is true: stories can save us" (255). Later in the chapter the
narrator suspends his story line to observe, "The thing
about a story is that you dream it as you tell it, hoping that
others might then dream along with you, and in this way
memory and imagination and language combine to make
spirits in the head" (259). When-six chapters after a
haunting story, "The Man I Killed"-our narrator intervenes with a brief chapter called "Good Form," he again
sounds very much like the writer of the Meditations. "It's
time to be blunt," he warns. "I'm forty-three years old,
true, and I'm a writer now, and a long time ago I walked
through Quang Ngai Province as a foot soldier. Almost
everything else is invented" (203). In both method and
intent, O'Brien parallels his fourteenth century predecessor, who uses only those sources "that occur to [him]" and
encourages us to "suppose that these things were said and
done by the lordjesus." The Man I Killed never lived; the
daughter, Kathleen, is a "story" not a "happening truth."
O'Brien ends "Good Form" with this:
What stories can do, I guess, is make things present. I can look
at things I never looked at. I can attach faces to grief and love
and pity and God. I can be brave. I can make myself feel
again.
'Daddy, tell the truth,' Kathleen can say, 'did you ever kill
anybody?' And I can say, honestly, 'Of course not.'
Or I can say, honestly, 'Yes' (204).

An even more remarkable spiraling of truth emerges
later in the novel from the death of a character unnamed
in the vision from "On the Rainy River." If we were to consider the events chronologically, the story would begin as
the platoon sets up in a night defensive position along a
paddy dike. The villagers try to warn them away, but only
later during a mortar attack do they realize that they have
camped on the edge of the village latrine; the river overflowing its banks and the incoming rounds turn their world
into a foul soup. The one casualty is Kiowa, a native
American from Oklahoma, perhaps the most decent member of the platoon: Struck by a round, he is enfolded in
the muck. 'Wasted in the waste," says Azar, the only one of
them who will risk any form of language to describe the
drowning death (187).
Next chronologically would be the platoon's search
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for Kiowa's body the following morning; then perhaps
twenty years later, Norman Bowker would write to Tim
O'Brien about the experience and ask him to tell it as a
story; next O'Brien would publish a story, try unsuccessfully
to make it fit into Going After Cacciato, and hear from
Norman Bowker that the story ignores all the important
parts; later Bowker's mother would write that her son has
committed suicide, and O'Brien would write "Speaking Of
Courage," a story that focuses on Norman Bowker at home
in Iowa, circling a lake on the 4th of July, haunted by the
past, his own inarticulate grief, and his isolation. The final
event would be O'Brien returning to Vietnam with his
daughter, revisiting the field, and, deep beneath its foul
surface, burying the hatchet Kiowa once carried in his
ruck. But of course it doesn't happen that way at all. The
story becomes really several stories occupying several chapters and blending past, present, and future through the
voices of at least six characters.
Where it begins-"Speaking of Courage"-provides a
good example of playing on time and space within a single
episode in order to contextualize the truth of Vietnam
within a larger framework of American values. The story
begins with Norman Bowker, "feeling safe inside his
father's big Chevy," driving a series of seven-mile, twentyfive minute laps around the glacial lake in his hometownclockwise. 'The road was a sort of boundary between the
affluent and the almost affluent," we are told, and as he
traces its loop, going nowhere, Bowker remains between
two external worlds to which he does not belong (157). In
his silence he may remind us of Hemingway's Harold
Krebs, from "Soldier's Home," who longs for a world without consequences. But unlike Krebs, for whom talking is
too complicated and ultimately pointless, Bowker longs for
someone to hear him. His dead high school friend Max,
with whom he used to discuss the existence of God, could
have heard, Bowker thinks. Sally Kramer, now Sally
Gustafson, he knows, is beyond hearing him. As afternoon
becomes evening, Bowker honks at two boys hiking along
the road, and he whispers to the workmen preparing for
the fireworks show, 'Want to hear about the Silver Star I
almost won?" But no one sees or hears him (163).
It is his father to whom Norman Bowker wants to tell
the story of how he tried to save his friend Kiowa from
drowning, but his father, absorbed by a television baseball
game, is out of reach. And so Bowker essentially invents his
father in order to imagine the talk they would have if only
they could. The lake, "a good audience for silence," is the
center of a town that "could not talk, and would not listen.
... It had no memory, therefore no guilt.. . . It was a brisk,
polite town. It did not know shit about shit, and did not
care to kno':V" (163). Bowker, himself the timepiece for an
alien, changeless world, reconstructs the story of Kiowa's
death in the subjunctive mood-"would've said, could've
The Cresset

said." In Bowker's only conversation, as he is trying to
order a hamburger at the A&W, O'Brien ironically introduces Vietnam jargon in the disembodied voice from the
intercom. Bowker is so out of touch and out of time that
he first irritates an incredulous carhop by honking for his
order. As he calls for food, the gap between his internal
world and the world of what should be home is underscored by the language:
The intercom squeaked and said, 'Order.'
'Mama Burger and fries,' Norman Bowker said.
'Affirmative, copy clear. No rootie-tootie?'
'Rootie-tootie?'
'You know, man-root beer.'
'A small one.'
'Roger-dodger. Repeat: one Mama, one fries, one small
beer. Fire for effect. Stand by.'

When he is finished, Bowker summons the voice again, and
it is as close as we come in the story to communication:

'All done.'
'That's it?'
'I guess so.'
'Hey, loosen up,' the voice said. 'What you really need,
friend?'
Norman Bowker smiled.
'Well, he said, 'how'd you like to hear about-'
He stopped and shook his head.
'Hear what, man?'
'Nothing.'
'Well, hey,' the intercom said, 'I'm sure as fuck not going anywhere. Screwed to a post, for God sake. Go ahead, try me.'
'Nothing.'
'You sure?'
'Positive. All done.'
The intercom made a light sound of disappointment. 'Your
choice, I guess. Over an' out.'
'Out,' said Norman Bowker.(l70-71)

The chapter ends when finally, on his twelfth revolution, Bowker stops beside the lake and wades into it. 'The
water felt warm against his skin. He put his head under.
He opened his lips, very slightly, for the taste, then he
stood up and folded his arms and watched the fireworks.
For a small town, he decided, it was a pretty good show"
(173). In this appropriately inarticulate and insular gesture
(reminiscent of his attempt to retrieve Kiowa), Bowker is as
ambiguous as Bartleby in a "dead wall reverie." This is the
context within which O'Brien chooses to begin the story of
Kiowa's death.
Norman Bowker's story, an almost "Speaking of
Courage," suggests that there is no such thing as returning
home-that is, coming back in time. And O'Brien's telling
creates a new sense of time in order to reimagine that
abstraction, home, and the values it implies. It is comparaMay 1994

ble to the medieval writers' recasting of absolute values in
contemporary forms.

As a culture we attempted to make Vietnam a linear
war. There were 365 days to be marked off a short-timer's
calendar, one step to count after the other in an attempt to
measure what refused mathematical calculation. It was a
war of attrition that would not yield finally to bombs or
body counts. And so perhaps the final word must come in
the most familiar and slippery expression of the Vietnam
War-"There it is." The pronoun, of course, has no
antecedent, and so soldiers used the expression as a kind of
recognition that experience could exceed the immediate
powers of language. At one point of the novel, the retrospective O'Brien uses it as a near benediction, and so will I:
There it is. There it is, my friend, there it is-as if the
repetition itself were an act of poise, a balance between
crazy and almost crazy, knowing without going, there it
is ... (20). 0
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TAKING PHILOSOPHY PERSONALLY
Charles Taliaferro

"And to this question (the question of God's existence) cuery incident in the
history of the world is relevant-whether it is the fall of a sparrow or the
coming of the harvest, the passing of an empire or the fading of a smile"
John Wzsdom, "The Logic of God" 1970

Philosophers may take persons and personal concerns
seriously-or they may not. Philosophers can be impersonal both when it comes to what they believe and how they
practice their discipline. Many philosophers have articulated impersonal views of the cosmos according to which its
origin and ultimate constituents are impersonal. There is
no grounding of the cosmos in an underlying intelligence,
the universe as a whole does not have any thought and feeling, and there is little sympathy with panpsychism, according to which all of matter has some psychic life.
Philosophers have not only questioned the existence of a
Divine person; they also question whether human persons
exist. There are even cases when philosophers have wondered whether there are persons other than themselves
(How do I know you are a person and not an hallucination or a
mindless automaton?) and some philosophers, braver still,
have concluded that there are no persons whatever.
Witness a recent philosophical paper by Peter Unger, "Why
There Are No People." A steady stream of philosophers
questions whether persons, if they do in fact exist, have
beliefs and desires. In the realm of ethics, moreover, some
philosophers are anxious to establish that "in various ways,
our reasons for acting should become more impersonal.
Greater impersonality may seem threatening. But it would
be better for everyone." (As an aside, it is not obvious who
or what is being referred to by "everyone", for the philosoCharles Taliaferro teaches in the Department of Philosophy at St.
Olaf College. His book, Consciousness and the Mind of God,
will be published l7y Cambridge University Press in the fall of 1994.
He would like to thank J Evans, D. Horner, M. Nelson, T.
Chapell and P. Richmond for comments on an earlier version of
this article.
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pher who advanced this recommendation for impersonality, Derek Parfit, does not believe that persons exist.) When
it comes to practicing their discipline, some philosophers
seem so bent on disregarding personal concerns that their
practice of philosophy seems clinical and unfeeling. One of
my otherwise favorite philosophers of the 18th century,
Thomas Reid, once remarked: "A philosophical analysis of
the objects of taste is like applying the anatomical knife to
a fine face. The design of the philosopher, as well as the
anatomist, is not to gratify taste, but to improve knowledge." This gives me the chilly impression that philosophers are not so much lovers of wisdom as they are
intellectual vivisectionists! I can carry out a philosophical
exchange with you impersonally when I treat you as merely
an audience for my views, a faceless member of some
group, or if I take an active disinterest in your thoughts and
feelings, your history and future.
The lay of the philosophical landscape is, of course,
quite complex. Many philosophers are certain that persons
exist; I do not claim that embracing what I have called an
impersonal view of the cosmos will invariably lead to an
impersonal and unfeeling practice of philosophy. I know
many affable, outgoing, personally engaging philosophers
who do not think persons exist, and other friendly philosophers who deny persons have feeling, emotions or thoughts
except in some very crude "loose and popular" sense which
is ripe for elimination and replacement by more
respectable scientific entities like neurological states.
Moreover, I don't wish to deny that there are occasions
when acting in what would be called an impersonal manner seems altogether appropriate. If your treating me personally means your treating me with tailor-made malice, I
might much prefer that you adopt a cooler, impersonal
vantage point in which you treat me as part of some social
grouping which you feel obliged to respect. I do not wish
to attempt here an exhaustive catalogue of appropriate
personal and impersonal stances, as valuable as that may
be. What I wish to point out is that a philosopher's substanThe Cresset

tive conclusions and methods, as well as her motivations
and attitudes, may be characterized broadly as personal or
impersonal; and I suggest, further, that how they are characterized will be shaped to a significant extent by her ultimate view of things. Christianity invites philosophers to
take persons and personal concerns seriously. I will sketch
here four specific respects in which it does so: we are called
(1) to recognize fully the reality of persons and (2) their
importance, (3) to be personally responsive to values and
disvalues in an intensified affective manner, and ( 4) to
understand the role of philosophy as importantly linked to
personal fulfillment. Christianity, in its classical form,
thinks of God as a supremely good, purposive, creative reality-a person intimately concerned with the creation and
this has a bearing on how Christianity can inform the
philosophical enterprise.

The Nature of Persons
The first and most general point to stress is that
Christianity invites philosophers to take seriously the claim
that persons exist in a cosmos which is itself grounded in
the reality of God. The ultimate account of the continued
existence of the cosmos is not entirely impersonal or subpersonal. Biblical narratives, which are the centerpiece of
Christian tradition, speak without embarrassment of God's
love, knowledge, thoughts and activities. Christian philosophers (or philosophical Christians, if you like) are challenged to weigh carefully these claims in their view of the
emotions, knowledge, thinking, and purposive activity.
Recognizing the ultimacy of a Divine purposive reality will
place the Christian at odds with many popular assumptions
in the current philosophical scene.
It is widely assumed in the philosophy of mind and in
theories of language and meaning that adequate explanations must ultimately rest in subpersonal, nonintentional
states and laws. Daniel Dennett's recent claim is representative: "Only a theory that explained conscious events in
terms of unconscious events could explain consciousness at
all." Christianity will not force one to reject explanations
which are subpersonal or make no explicit recourse to consciousness, but it will invite us to treat as intelligible and
philosophically respectable some personal explanations as
well. There is nothing amiss with scientific research into
the vital ways in which our physical and psychological life is
intertwined; we only get on thin ice from a Christian point
of view if we take the further step of insisting that these
accounts entitle us to reject as chimerical the personal
world of subjective experience and action. Accounts of the
person are to explain but not to explain away the fact that
we act for reasons, and have emotions and sensations. For
those in sympathy with the Christian vision of the cosmos,

May 1994

projects like those propounded by eliminative materialists
who reject out of hand the adequacy of personal explanations with their appeal to beliefs and desires will not appear
obviously right nor, to use a phrase employed in the literature to describe the materialist option, "the only game in
town." In the Christian universe, the existence of created
personal agents will not be construed as utterly anomalous.
Rather, the existence of persons images the existence of a
broader, Divine agency which is itself responsible for the
existence of the cosmos and its laws of matter and energy,
evolution and emergence.
The Christian philosopher informed by Biblical tradition will also be hesitant to accept narrow accounts about
what may count as persons. Some Christian philosophers
have been reluctant to call God a person, much less three
persons, because of the link between the notion of being a
person and being a human being, a specific animal species.
The Oxford English Dictionary preserves such a species-specific notion of person, as it records the primacy of defining a
person as a human being. Even so, there will be some tension here for the Christian philosopher who believes that
the ultimate reality of the universe is describable (however
elusively and with heavy recourse to metaphor and analogy) as a person who has made human persons in the divine
image and encountered us in the person of Christ. Much
Christian spirituality of prayer, meditation and contemplation would be unintelligible unless it were based on the
conviction that God is a personal reality, both in the context of the life of Christ as the God-incarnate, as well as
quite apart from the incarnation. Overall, I believe
Christianity invites a broad acknowledgment of what can
meaningfully be asserted of the personal domain of acting,
knowing, and feeling; it thereby leads us to question the
merits of more restrictive theories of meaning like positivism.
At the end of the 20th century we are still feeling the
influence of a form of scientific positivism which insists that
to be meaningful, our terms have to refer to what can
empirically be tested or verified in the way one would verify statements about the behavior of material objects, be
they tables, planets or sodium salt. This movement, exemplified by the Vienna Circle in the 1920s, sought to declare
meaningless all reference to a personal God. Talk of God's
knowing and loving the cosmos take us outside the perimeter of more respectable talk of experientially testable material object behavior. For similar reasons, talk about an
objective ethical order according to which moral judgments are true or false was likewise thrown overboard as
nonsensical. Christianity will challenge this suffocating,
misplaced rigourism; Christian philosophers have joined
others in pressing objections against such positivist theories. In recent decades much of the force of positivism has

17

been diffused due both to external criticism and the incisive internal criticism whereby positivists have been routinely forced to revise the theory so as not to rule out as
nonsensical their criterion of meaning itself and various
scientific hypotheses they wish to preserve.
Christianity does not compel one to adopt one specific theory of human nature or persons, though it will rule
out some, such as the eliminative scheme I noted which
denies that there are any persons at all. In the main, I
think Christianity calls us to adopt an approach to persons
that carefully balances the material and the immaterial.
Our material nature is not to be disparaged. As C.S. Lewis
once commented: "God likes matter, He invented it." At
the same time, we should not ignore features of ourselves
and consciousness at large (in both human and nonhuman
animal form) which is not identical with our material
states. We might extend Lewis' comment to: God likes
immaterial mental states as well, for God has brought about
consciousness which is not itself a material thing or state.
Many, though by no means all, Christian philosophers have
adopted what may' be considered alternative versions of
dualism insofar as they acknowledge a real distinction
between the mental and physical. While I believe that a
dualist outlook does indeed do justice to the central claims
of Christianity, and that it is supported by strong philosophical argumentation, a Christian acceptance of dualism
needs to be carefully distinguished from an unacceptable
form of value dualism according to which the body is denigrated or treated as possessing only marginal importance.
Christianity affirms the goodness of created, embodied life.
When there is a crippling break in the integration of mental and physical life, a Christian may see this as something
deeply tragic, not because having a body at all is bad, but
because this is a disfiguring of something of great value.
Some dualist theories in the ancient world treated the body
as a prison, something that encumbered the soul and we
would be better off without. A Christian form of dualism
will resist such Platonic machinations.
Hegel complained that viewing the self as dual-nature
contributes to "unhappy consciousness" and a range of
Christian philosophers have sought ostensibly happier,
more unified views than dualism offers, construing human
persons as exclusively physical, or, conversely, understanding human persons and all so-called material as states of
immaterial, mental objects. C.S. Peirce, along with many
others, adopted this second stance, viewing God and matter as both immaterial. What we assume to be physical is
actually a cluster of mental sensations, colors, shapes, sizes,
textures, and the like. We routinely make the mistake of
treating these sensory phenomena as nonmental, intact
material objects. The materialist, nonidealist option is better represented today among Christians than the move
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Peirce adopted. Christian materialists have held that while
God is immaterial, God has created a cosmos which is
robustly physical without any dangling, immaterial parts.
The issues at stake here cannot be settled easily and all I
wish to highlight is that however one attempts to develop a
fine grained theory of the mental and physical, Christianity
is committed to the full- fledged reality of persons as thinking, feeling, agents. My own recommendation for those
interested in developing a philosophical articulate theory
of persons is to begin with a form of dualism. You will be
midway between materialism and idealism and will be well
placed to consider the merits and drawbacks of each.
The Ethics of Persons
A second area in which Christianity invites us to take
persons seriously has to do with the ethical. Prominent
Christians have been found in most schools of ethics. It is a
testimony to the richness of the faith that it is not anchored
in one particular ethical philosophy, but is capable of
being articulated in different, otherwise competing frameworks. I see this as an especially good thing as, in my view,
many ethical theories mistakenly try to cover too much terrain. We should not expect the approach to ethics which is
grounded in, say, virtue theory to be able to do everything,
and the same is true with respect to the ethics of duty and
the ethics of consequentialist outcomes. In the work I have
done in ethical theory I have sought to articulate a framework that is amenable to drawing on these different
resources. Whatever one's leanings in terms of ethical
frameworks, I want to underscore here the central role of
the person.
Just as Christianity resists the elimination of persons
and personal experience in the philosophy of nature,
Christianity also resists the submersion of the person into
subpersonal moral categories. This is especially pertinent
when it comes to assessing the credentials of certain forms
of utilitarianism. These ethical theories understand right
and wrong action in terms of whether they contribute to
certain desirable end states. The most popular portrait of
the end state involves preference-satisfaction or happiness.
So, to wax technical, one version of utilitarianism is that an
act is morally right if and only if there is no other act available to the agent which will produce greater preference-satisfaction. It is possible to accept this and remain within
Christian tradition if one assumes certain views of what is
truly preference satisfying. John Stuart Mill, the most
prominent 19th century defender of utilitarianism, and
William Paley, a philosophical theologian of the same period, were both firmly convinced of the compatibility of
Christianity and utilitarianism. Still, there are reasons for
caution here, as utilitarians wind up promoting a conception of value anchored in preference-satisfaction and, only
The Cresset

--indirectly, in terms of the person himself or herself.
Persons wind up being treated as valuable only because
they are the bearers or vehicles of preference satisfaction.
Such a view has been characterized as "the bucket view of
the self," the self being a mere container for what is good.
This criticism may be met by utilitarians, but my point here
is that the Christian insistence on the reality and worth of
the created person will not easily be allied with ethical theories which give persons value only because of their capacity for preferences and having these preferences satisfied. If
one is to be a Christian utilitarian, it will be important to
ensure a certain view of how to distinguish which preferences demand our moral attention and which do not, and
to ensure that the worth of a person qua person is not
unduly subsumed or otherwise sacrificed. God is represented in scripture and tradition as taking pleasure in persons
qua persons as acting, knowing, feeling, responsible agents,
and not simply as bundles of preferences and satisfactions.
The Christian understanding of created pe rsons as
reflective of God's reality will also provide a check on some
communitarian views of ethics. As they seek to understand
our moral and political life in the context of specific moral
traditions and social contexts, some communitarians are
stridently opposed to ethical and political theories which
try to adjudicate between competing traditions. Because
they dismiss such an Archimedean point of reference independent of specific, social frameworks , communitarians
often wind up embracing a form of relativism. Whether an
act is right or wrong depends entirely upon whether it conforms to or detracts from the prevailing social institutions.
Communitarians are antagonistic to the universalism of the
Enlightenment which promoted the ideal of autonomous
indi\'iduality and the sufficiency of human reason to discover all important moral truths. They have opposed what may
be called monistic or homogeneous theories of human
nature according to which we may understand all worthwhile human striving in a framework that admits only one
human good. Thus, they are often anti-utilitarian, and
antagonistic to the notion that moral issues must always be
settled (if they are to be settled at all) by way of calculating
preference-satisfaction. In their eyes, such a stance ignores
the diversity of human life and the multifarious ways in
which communities may be structured. Sometimes linked
with the communitarians and offering it strong support is
the social constructionist, who believes that persons are
manufactured by social institutions. Radical constructionists force one to take the community seriously because it is
the community itself which gives birth to the individual
person, not vice versa.
Christianity is not inimical to all goals of communitarianism. Christians may certainly wish to repudiate the radical individualism of some Enlightenment luminaries and to
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recognize community-social ideals in which persons live in
contextual interplay. The doctrine of the Trinity has sometimes been viewed as lending support to a communitarian
outlook, and there is no idealized notion of individualism
in prizing the Church as the Body of Christ. Christianity is
also friendly to communitarianism when it comes to
accounts of human motivation. Christian philosophers
have historically been insistent upon the existence of
diverse goods which persons may worthily pursue (bonum
variationis) and which do not admit of facile comparison
and trading. In medieval philosophy it was common to
think of God's creativity as reflecting a principle of plenitude according to which God realizes the widest array of
goods, and the cosmos was seen as a virtually boundless
forum for Divine fecundity.
Even so, classical Christianity will not be able to
accommodate the complete communitarian program, holding as it does that underneath our various social configurations, there are certain goods and ills that we are all called
to pursue and avoid irrespective of our tradition. Cultural
differences may well shape how it is that justice is to be
achieved and Christian love is to be practiced, but
Christianity will insist that the appeal to culture is not the
final and exclusive arbiter of defining good and ill, justice
and love versus injustice and malice. Christianity will allow
for the possibility that some cultures may indeed so integrate wrongful practices such as genocide campaigns, slavery or other less official systematic oppression that these
cultures as whole social complexes stand as unjust. Classical
Christianity, locating a reference point in God's point of
view, holds us accountable to more than our various traditions; rather, we are accountable to the One who engendered the whole cosmos with all its complex forms of life.
The insistence upon the limits of tradition and community
comes clearly to the fore when one considers Christian
teaching about the stranger. Biblical sources speak with
special emphasis on the importance of treating the
stranger or outsider with respect. There is a check on the
attractive temptation to treat outsiders as sub-personal and
not having a claim on our conscience. As for social constructionism, Christian thinkers have long recognized that
many aspects of ourselves are shaped by our institutions
and public life. I think a moderate constructionism is compatible with classical Christianity so long as the former does
not assume that the person's being "constructed" means
that the person does not actually exist. From a more temperate theoretical vantage point, a person's being said to
be constructed may mean simply that persons grow and
develop in relation to one another. Clearly our identities
are shaped by our social and cultural context. But if the
more radical constructionist insists that the person is no
more than an insubstantial shadow cast by institutions or a
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construction of language with only fictional standing, then
this amounts to a subverting of the person that is alien to
classical Christianity.
Consider, however, an objection that Christianity
places too much emphasis on persons in the ethical
domain. The objection I raise here emerges from environmental concerns and may be stated simply. Much ecological damage has been done out of an ideology that is
homocentric, seeing humans as the only morally interesting reference point. It is possible to define ecological sensibility as thinking in long range, intelligent terms about the
effect of ecological changes for all humans (not just one's
self, city or nation), including future generations. But
arguably this remains excessively human centered as it fails
to recognize the intrinsic value of nonhuman animal life
and whatever value resides in the ecosystem itself, value
that has a claim on our respect and action quite independent of whether the animals or ecosystem contribute to
human welfare. Critics claim that the Christian emphasis
on the value of human persons is partly responsible for the
current ecological crisis.
It is indisputable that some of the teachings of
Christianity have been used to disregard and even exploit
natural goods. In my view this represents a manipulation
and distortion of Christianity. But even if you think
Christianity allows for this ecologically reckless application,
it is clear that Christianity has also historically invited an
ethic of environmentally sensitive stewardship. Today
there is a widespread Green movement within the
Christian community, a movement which includes radical
eco-holists, Christian vegetarians who adopt a strict reverence for life principle (akin to Schweitzer) along with the
more moderate eco-humanists. The Christian emphasis on
the reality and value of persons certainly does not entail
the exclusive reality and value of persons. My remarks earlier on the Christian celebration of a plenitude of goods
underscores that the Christian religion is open to the discovery and respect of nonhuman, divinely-created goods,
including nonhuman animals and the ecosystem itself.

The Concerns of Persons
A third area in which Christianity invites the personal
involves the magnification of values in general.
Christianity understands God as being intimately concerned about the life of the cosmos, a position which
invites us to understand the values and disvalues of the cosmos in magnified, religious terms. We are to be affectively
responsive to the values in the world both because of their
intrinsic nature as well as because such responsiveness is
integral to our relationship with God. In religious terms, it
is at once unethical and a sacrilege to treat others unjustly.
I believe that some things would be wrong even if (per
20

impossibile) there were no God, but given that God does
exist, these wrongs are all the worse. As Soren Kierkegaard
put it: "because sin is against God, it is infinitely magnified." I will try to defend this by appealing to God's affective presence in the world and Divine ownership as
together providing the grounds for understanding our
moral life in intensified personal terms. My aim here will
not be to articulate a Christian ethics from the ground up,
but to highlight these two features of a Christian ethic
which have implications for the general character of values.
What follows will be a brief account of what I have developed in more detail elsewhere.
Consider first God's affective presence. What does it
mean to claim that God is present to the cosmos?
Christianity shares with Judaism and Islam the conviction
that God is the all powerful, all knowing, good creator of
the cosmos, and consequently God's presence throughout
the cosmos is understood (in part) as God's knowing each
region of the cosmos, God being responsible for the existence of each region (no region of the cosmos would exist
were it not for God's ongoing, creative conservation), and
God's being able to act in and upon each region (bringing
about various changes) . As God is a being of supreme
goodness, God's presence throughout the cosmos also has
an ethical dimension, and I believe this is best captured in
affective terms: God is affectively responsive to the values
and disvalues of the cosmos. Such affective response
involves fitting or rightful pleasure and sorrow in values
and disvalues. Thus, I think that part of what it means to
say that God is present to our world of mixed justice and
injustice is that God takes pleasure in the justice and sorrow in the injustice. This stance is formally titled passibilism in contrast to impassibilism (from the Latin for
'without passion'), the thesis that God lacks pain and sorrow. Various Biblical passages speak freely of God in affective terms as feeling grief and anger over the world's ills,
and such testimony has brought many theological philosophers to question the impassibilist model of the Divine.
Impassibilism is also challenged by the Biblical understanding of Christ as God incarnate, affectively concerned with
others, weeping at the tomb of Lazarus and bearing the
unmistakable suffering of crucifixion. In an important
book, The Suffering of the Impassible God ( 1928), Bertrand
Brasnett wrote:
"When a good man turns to evil and a bad man turns to
good, these facts are not without significance for the life of God.
To suppose that they are is to write God down as indifferent to
good or evil... But if God rejoices over the conversion of the evildoer and sorrows over the good man who goes astray, his happiness and sorrow must vary in some degree as good or evil
predominate upon the earth .. . So far as we can see, sin must cause
to God an everlasting pain."
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Appreciation of this affective dimension to God's presence
in the world stands in tension with a more detached, intellective view of God: It accentuates a personal understanding of God over against an impersonal view.
To cite
Kierkegaard again: "God is not some externality in the
sense that a policeman is." What role does God's affective
presence have as far as magnifying our understanding of
the ethical?
I shall assume, as most do, that there are cases when
the good or evil of an event is due to the pleasure and suffering involved. If I injure some innocent person, Eric, I
assume that part of what makes this bad is that I have
caused Eric to suffer, moreover it seems to me that the
more suffering I cause him, the greater the evil. Pleasure
can also comprise the good of some event. So, I suggest
that many ethicists are right when they claim that pleasure
in certain goods is itself good. Thus, friendship and justice
are goods and pleasure in friendship and justice is itself an
additional good. I am not suggesting here that we take on
board a sort of crude hedonism, according to which all and
only suffering is evil and all and only pleasure is good.
Rather, I think, we should insist that some pleasures are
wicked-like the pleasure of the torturer-and some things
may be wrong even if they do not involve any tangible suffering, e.g., painless killings. We are not back with the utilitarianism discussed in the last section with its bucket view
of the self. My point is simply that there are cases when
some things are wrong because of the sorrow involved, and
good because of the pleasure, and this is compatible with
believing that persons themselves have value for their own
sake and not just because they are capable of pleasure.
With these qualifications in place, I propose that if God is
affectively integral to the cosmos, then the ills and goods of
the world give rise to a greater sorrow and pleasure than if
there were no such God at all. My maliciously striking Eric
is wrong first and foremost because of the wrong done to
him, and the suffering he endures, but it is all the worse an
act I do if it causes suffering to God as well. Similarly, if
God is affectively integral to the cosmos, there is a respect
in which the goods of the cosmos give rise to the additional good of pleasure in the good. So, promise-keeping and
trustworthiness are goods, and there is also the good which
is realized when God "is pleased with those who keep their
word" (Proverbs 12:22). It is vital to appreciate that such
affective responsiveness to the cosmos is not simply the
reaction of a remote observer but the response of a being
who is integrally present to the cosmos as its creator. The
bearing of such presence has often been articula ted in
terms of the cosmos belonging to God.
God's ownership of the cosmos has been upheld in
Judaism and Islam as well as Christianity. The idea is that
as the cosmos is God's creation and its continued existence
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depends upon God at each instant, the cosmos may be said
to belong to God. The moral bearing of this is much contested. There are debates in the literature in the problem
of evil over precisely how far Divine ownership extends. But
there is broad agreement among Christian theists that part
of what Divine ownership involves means that injury to the
creation constitutes also a wrong against God. When I am
cruel to you, I do a wrong to you as well as to the Divine
being to whom you and I both belong and who calls us to
live justly. On such a view, then, if the God of Christianity
Q"udaism or Islam) exists to whom the creation belongs,
the ills of the world are even more grave than if there were
no God. Similarly goods are even greater; the care for the
environment, humanitarian aid to those in famine and so
on, all count as good in themselves as well as good because
they involve acting in accord with the will of the good God
to whom all creation belongs.
Other material could be brought in here to highlight
different respects in which Christianity understands the
ethical as a dimension of the relation between persons and
God, and the various respects in which the Christian view
of revelation has led to a widening of moral concerns. I
have simply tried to sketch only two fundamental ways in
which acknowledging a personal God to whom we belong
serves to extend the parameter of appreciating the values
and disvalues at stake. My point has not been that the sole
reason why we should be concerned with injustice and justice is because of God's affective presence and Divine ownership, but rather, given injustice and justice, the
acknowledgment of the God of Christianity provides us
with a way to see our morality as a part of a larger framework involving a personal relation with God.
Personal Concerns
Finally, I believe that Christianity invites us to understand the project of philosophy as part of the broader matter of personal fulfillment. According to Christianity, a key
ingredient of our deep fulfillment as persons is founded in
relationship with God. Philosophy can detract from this
end in various ways. It can, of course, lead one to depart
from Christianity altogether, and if it doesn't do this, it can
still do damage if it inclines the Christian to an excessively
cerebral conception of God which kills affection. It can do
these things, but it need not do either. I believe that philosophical reflection may lend support to Christian theism
and can enhance one's relationship with God, and our
relationship with one another in a spiritually vital relationship.
The 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who
was himself a Christian though not of an orthodox stripe,
once wrote: "For the Thoughts are to the Desires, as Scouts
and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the Things
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Desired." Christian philosophers have differed in their
assessment of how much successful scouting philosophy
can do. Some hold that philosophy may lead one to accept
the existence of a personal God, and can do so without
making any appeal to special revelation claims (Biblical
sources) . Others believe philosophy may only carry out a
more modest role of elucidating the content of revelation
claims and pull off the negative project of exposing weaknesses with incompatible non-Christian schemas.
Philosophy on this model would have the role of making
room for faith, showing that it is not ruled out by intellectual objections. From either perspective and from the
standpoint of various qualified positions taken up in
between them, philosophy would have a role in helping us
to grasp more fully the object of our desire, the God to
whom we are called into relationship.
Perhaps the greatest witness to the ways in which the
pursuits of philosophy and the pursuit of a relationship
with God may tie together is from the medieval period.
Augustine, Anselm, Boethius, Bonaventure, and Aquinas
all carried out philosophy in ways that were marked by a
personal yearning for God and at times by evidence of a
profoundly deep religious experience of God. In the
Confessions Augustine wove together sophisticated treatment of time and eternity, matter and soul, with a prayerful
dialogue with God. At one juncture Augustine is wrestling
with the philosophy of time and considering the breadth of
the present moment (How long is the present?
Is it an
instant and hence of no duration at all? If so, how can
duration be made up of things with no extension?).
There is no break in his stream of reflection from the philosophy of time to Augustine's beseeching God for illumination.
Amid the thickest passages on metaphysics and
epistemology, Augustine offers God adoration and thanksgiving and there is testimony to his felt experience of God.
The same tone of personal-human exchange is found in
Anselm's writing. The relation with God expressed in
Anselm's work seems less like a Scout or Spy in a foreign
country, and more like the relation between friends or
even lover and beloved.
There is a texture to Augustine's and Anselm's work
(as well as a host of others) that does not have an easily
identifiable secular counterpart. If I believe ultimate reality
to be impersonal matter and energy, it makes little sense
fo r me to fashion my philosophy in dialogue with this ultimate stuff. The philosopher who articulates what he
believes to be the ultimate subpersonal reality of the world
is investigating something which is less thoughtful and conscious than he is; it is less on both fronts because it lacks
thought and consciousness altogether. J.R. Lucas captures
the contrary, distinctively personal characteristic of a
Christian philosophy:
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If God is a person, it follows that our relations with God are
personal relations ... God is not a Thing. Nor is he an Idea. If we
were Platonists, we might believe that there was some technique
whereby we could emancipate ourselves from the shackles of our
earthly existence and put ourselves on a level with the Forms. But
God, being a living spirit, has a different sort of existence from
the dead timelessness of the Forms. Knowledge of him is not like
knowledge of mathematical truths, which any man can set himself
to come to know, but like knowledge of persons, and is essentially
an interchange between two parties, requiring not only our wish
to know, but his willingness to be known.
On this model, philosophy invites personal involvement
and the vibrancy of a living exchange.
Perhaps the closest parallel to the Christian approach
in philosophy would be the Tibetan Buddhist school which
construes philosophy as importantly linked to salvation.
The goal of philosophy is understood by the Tibetan
Buddhist to be salvation, and true to such a spirit there is a
prescribed practice of meditation to be carried out prior to
philosophical exchange. It may be too much to suppose
that Christianity invites us to see all regions of philosophy
as contributing to salvation (Does one's view of pronouns in the
philosophy of language have high salvivic value?), but
Christians may find some kinship with the Tibetan
Buddhist very wide notion of salvation as something that
can have an intellectual dimension, namely: There are
times when we need to be saved from our confusion, even
our confusion about the nature of language. Adherents to
Christianity and Tibetan Buddhism will find themselves
allied with many other philosophers who understand philosophy as being able to make an important contribution
to human flourishing, and not something essentially
wrapped up in gamesmanship, intellectual vanity, manipulation, and so on. But where the Christian will part company with the Tibetan Buddhist is still significant and signals a
major divergence in their respective views of God and the
self. For the traditional Tibetan Buddhist there is certainly
meditation and prayer and these may be intermixed in the
pursuit of philosophical goals, yet there is no belief in a
personal God who hears these prayers or takes pleasure in
the meditative union of the human soul and God. There is
no belief in the initiative of a personal God who engages us
in a gracious encounter. There is, instead, a far reaching
skepticism about the self as an enduring, individual being
and the existence of a personal God with whom to relate.
Again, it is the Christian's view of ultimate reality which
shapes the personal character of her philosophical quest.
For this reason, and because in meeting a person,
and certainly in knowing the person, we know her philosophy-her sense of what is important in life--1 conclude
that if we take persons seriously, we must take philosophy
seriously as well. 0
The Cresset

---

-

Review Essay

FRAGMENTS AND WHOLENESS
Thomas D. Kennedy

Larry L. Rasumssen. Moral Fragments and Moral Community:
A Proposal for Church in Society. Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
1993.
Marva]. Dawn. Sexual Character: Beyond Technique to
Intimacy. Grand Rapids, Ml: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1993.
The union of these two books in a review may at first
glance resemble the purely arbitrary unions, based merely
on desire and adventitious circumstances, rightfully derided by Dawn; this appears a coupling founded only on the
momentary desire of this reviewer. Larry Rasmussen is
Reinhold Niebuhr Professor of Social Ethics at Union
Theological Seminary in New York and Mora/Fragments is a
scholarly treatise written for theologians and thoughtful
church administrators. Marva Dawn, while she holds a
Ph.D. in ethics and the Scriptures from the University of
Notre Dame, is a church-worker and her book is admittedly
popular, attempting to reach laity and clergy alike with
some good news about sex. But both books are written by
theologians raised Lutheran and both books are attempts
to call the church to be a faithful moral community.
Rasmussen's work can be read as an attempt to provide a
theoretical basis for the call to the church to be a community and Dawn's book a practical application of the church
as moral community. This is not, of course, to claim that

Tom Kennedy, Book Review Editor for The Cresset, sends this
review from Cambridge, England, where he and his wife Me/odie
are completing the first year of a two-year term directing the VU
Study Center. Professor Kennedy teaches numerous courses at VU,
frequently connecting philosophy with theology and popular culture.
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Rasmussen would be happy with Dawn's practical advice or
Dawn with Rasmussen's theory.
Rasmussen writes as a type of modern Jeremiah.
Reading the papers and reading the words of contemporary social theorists we cannot avoid the conclusion that
modernity is in its last breaths and that now in "modernitypostmodernity" we are treacherously living off" the remaining moral fragments and bits of community left by dying
modernity. Modernity has given us much that is good, but
it has also cost us much in the way of community and associational life. First the nation-state, now the market, has
sapped our communities of their lifeblood. There remains
no center to things and the future will be murder unless we
discover new forms of community to morally form and sustain us, to enable us as individuals and communities to
challenge the domination of our lives by the market.
Hence the need for the church to become a genuine moral
community.
Rasmussen's approach and the conclusion of his
argument are summarized well in the final chapter of his
book:
In fact it is not church scholars but a full passel of sociologists and social critics who say that our season of necessary experimentation in societies around the world requires special attention
to communal enclaves of a certain sort. Not all communal
enclaves, but those communities who socialize their members into
distinctive, observable ways of life with attention especially to what
might be called anticipatory communities. Anticipatory communities are those who work out, in nuts-and-bolts, trial-and-error
fashion, ways of life that just might map the ecology of community
for greater n urn bers of people on the far side of a jangled, precarious, extended time of transition. ( 143)
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Rasmussen's approach is to examine that fairly full
passel of sociologists he mentions. Of the book's eight
chapters only the last can be described as theological
rather than sociological in character. But the prior seven
chapters of sociology are very rich, as good a place as any
place I know of to read what the most important social theorists are saying about the breakdown of community and
the fragmentation of life which characterizes the end-ofthe-century Western world and about what is necessary for
a genuine community to exist amidst this fragmentation.
Rasmussen gives us w~ll-presented and hefty fares of
Christopher Lasch, Albert Borgmann, Alan Wolfe , and
Philip Selznick. And Rasmussen's discussion of the moral
inauthenticity of Reagan-Bush conservatism is utterly convincing. But to cast an argument about the church as community in the form The church had better become a base moral
community because the world cannot long endure the fragmentation of modernity without such moral communities is to reveal a

gross confusion about why the church exists, as Rasmussen
himself acknowledges in the book's penultimate paragraph. The church does not exist for its own sake, but neither does the church exist merely because at certain times
the contingent course of human events is morally
improved by the existence of institutions like the church.
The church exists because God has formed it to glorify
God and to further God's beneficent purposes for the
world. Social theorists may help us discern those purposes,
but the church is only indirectly answerable to them, if at
all. And any ecclesiology that brings in a theological discussion of the nature of the church only as an apparent
afterthought may well lead into a deeper and richer understanding of the necessary requirements for community in
this time and place but well not remind us of what it is
most important for the church to remember about its identity.
Rasmussen's call, in his final chapter, is for the church
for the sake of the world to become like the first followers
of Jesus before they were called Christians, to become like
the Jewish sect they first were, to become "the people of the
way." Rasmussen does not develop this "re-secting" of the
church in great detail, but enough brushstrokes are there
to gain a fair picture of what he thinks it means for the
church to be such a people. It is to be a people on a journey of love and fidelity to God, the compassionate and
righteous One who first loved us, to be a visible signinclusive and egalitarian-of God's merciful presence in
the world. This the church was, Rasmussen contends, in its
earliest years.
The faithful following of God took a radically wrong
turn in the fourth century and that has been our legacy to
this very day, Rasmussen believes. The ecumenical councils
"detached Uesus] from his own historic community and its
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way, and ... metaphysically fused [him] to God alone." (140)
With the union of "altar and throne" the church traded its
universalism for the universalism of empire. The
Reformation only continued this shift "from the God-centered Christology of an alternative servant community within the wider world to the Christ-centered theology of a universalizing empire itself." Rasmussen continues:
This absorption of virtually all of God into the Jesus of imperial Christianity is at the greatest remove from the theocentric
Jesus and his yeasty, salty, seedy community way. Deadly results
for Jews, pagans, indigenous peoples and cultures, would eventually follow. (142)

Rasmussen's call is for the church to engage in an
"exegesis of praxis and practices ... on a par with the exegesis of the canonical texts and traditions," to be a community of moral criticism and a haven in a destructive world, to
be like those first followers ofJesus.
There is much to be grateful for even in Rasmussen's
all too brief theological musings. Here is a theologian who
loves the church and writes for the well-being of the
church-a rare enough thing these days. To take his words
about the church as community to heart would demand of
us a time and an energy it is almost impossible to find in
our market-driven lives; it would demand of us new reaches
of charity and patience as we sit in pews next to the very
ones we find most unloveable. But it is to this that
Christians are called.
Still, despite his very helpful emphasis upon the
church as a genuine community of faith rather than a convention of professors I wonder whether Rasmussen's theological vision of the church is rich enough to sustain the
church as a moral community and whether his selection of
"the people of the way"as model is not both romantic and
arbitrary. Why, on what grounds, we may wonder, does
Rasmussen call us to be "the people of the way"? It is hard
to discern whether this preference is theological, historical,
or sociological. Why the early church, instead of, say, the
eighth century church? Apparently because he thinks that
the church councils of the fourth century and the union of
altar and throne are bad things. He suggests, for example,
a causal connection between Christocentrism and "deadly
results for Jews, pagans, and indigenous peoples and cultures," but he never explains just what this causal connection is, a connection it is far easier to assert than to establish. Nor does he seem to recognize that the actual universal character of the church came about as a result of the
very Christocentrism he abhors.
Furthermore, Rasmussen's observations about the
church councils and his disdain for the movement of the
church during the era of Constantine, Theodosius,and
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Justinian, wqile common enough these days, represents but
one reading of the church's story- a reading the persuasiveness of which increases only to the extent that one
neglects what the early church believed about the resurrection of Christ and its temporal implications. It is not surprizing that a church that confessed the resurrection of
Christ and the asc~nsion of Christ to reign with God on
high, that traced its origins to Pentecost, would develop a
theology of the civil order that would affirm the goodness
of political authorities who permitted the church to get on
with its task. Such a theology could be abused by the
authorities, to be sure. But to affirm the resurrection yet to
deny any implications of the resurrection for the political
order is to embrace a gnosticism that Rasmussen finds contemptible. One could, of course, deny the resurrection, a
cost the ecumenical church, even to this day, will not countenance, no matter how many theologians do. The early
church affirmed the resurrection and provided a theology
of resurrection which, while different from that of the
rulers who embraced the Christian faith, nevertheless recognized response to changing world events. Rasmussen
quotes Luther's affirmation that
The church is the pupil of Christ, sitting at his feet and
hearing his Word so that she may know how to pass judgment on
everything, how to serve in one's calling, how to administer public
offices, aye, also how to eat, drink, and sleep, that there may be
no doubt about the proper conduct in any walk of life but, surrounded on all sides by the Word of God, one may constantly
walk in joy and in the light. (153)

Marva Dawn's Sexual Character is an attempt to pass
judgment on how one's sex life might be formed in order
to walk in the joy and light of which Luther speaks. She
distinguishes between what she calls "social" sexuality-"all
aspects of our being that are distinct from specific feelings,
attitudes, or behaviors related or leading to genital union"
and "genital" sexuality (11). In other words, social sexuality encompasses everything else that characterizes us as
embodied male or female persons. Dawn wants to affirm
our social sexuality and encourage us to understand the
appropriate expressions of our genital sexuality, and these
appropriate expressions can best be discerned from an
examination of Christian Scriptures. Dawn affirms the traditional Christian teaching that genital sexuality is appropriately expressed in a lifelong commitment of man and
woman before God and the community.
What is novel about Dawn's approach is her attempt to
discuss genital sexuality as one aspect of an "ethics of character" and the church as a community called to the formation of the moral character of its people. Dawn's approach
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is not the approach adolescents expect when churchfolk
talk to them about sex-either "No sex before marriage
because God says no sex before marriage," or "How do you
feel about having sex with him/her?" Dawn's claim is that
what matters is that we become the sort of people God
wants us to be and the church should help us to be the
right sort of people with respect to sex as well as other
areas. The church's failure is a result of confusion, a lack
of courage, and a reluctance to be a genuine community,
and Dawn offers assistance in each of these areas. She provides the reader with many wise words of counsel.
There is little that Marva Dawn says in these pages that
is new to anyone who has read Stanley Hauerwas, little that
bears detailed theological investigation; that is not the
book's aim. My reason for including this book in this
review is simply that I know of no book I would sooner
place in the hands of an adolescent who wanted some
clear, non-preachy, unsophisticated but not simplistic, talk
about how he or she should think about genital sexuality.
This is a fine book, a good resource for all who deal with
teenagers.
This isn't to say that the book is without problems
(and I am not thinking here of what I take to be some
extraordinarily "cheesey" comments about her relationship
with her husband, Myron, despite her demurrers that
young people really like to hear this stuff.) Her criticisms
of the idolatry of sex in our society are well-made, but her
own comments about the "beauty" of marital sex suggest a
romanticization of sex all too close itself to idolatry. And
too frequently her affirmation of chastity seems to be based
on the grounds that one's marital life will be all the better
for it, a claim which I would like to believe, though I know
no evidence for it. More importantly this claim reduces
chastity to a mere means to the good of marriage and this
is not clearly compatible with the ethics of character she
advocates. Finally, Dawn's argument relies too heavily on
specific textual references for a picture of the good of marriage and genital sexuality. Even in a book for a popular
audience one would hope for something theologically richer than Dawn provides.
Still, when all is said and done, Dawn's book is a most
helpful starting point for thinking about sex and about the
church as a community which can form and inform us as
we journey in faith. And Larry Rasmussen has insightfully
directed us to why, for the sake of the world, the church
ought not delay in the task of community-building.
Rasmussen sees some signs of hope in the church, as well as
some secular signs of new communities that may serve as
"anticipatory communities" for "modernity-postmodernity."
And he offers a good place for people of the church to
begin their reflections about being such a moral community. 0
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ing about. . . . Each area of knowledge disclosed another, and another. Knowledge
wasn't a body, or a tree, but instead air, or
space, or being-whatever pervaded, whatever never ended and fitted into the smallest
cracks and the widest space between stars
(106£).

Air and Space
Charles Vandersee

Dear Editor:
Some of us in American universities are going to have to take time this
summer and visit our more dispirited
colleagues, leaving a card with them.
Also hit the bars and coffee shops
where the politicians and pundits hang
out, leaving the card. Also with people
who write editorials and op-ed
columns. The card reads:
What can we make of the inexpressible joy of children? . . . You thought you
knew the place [that is, the world around
you] and all its routines, but you see you
hadn't known. Whole stacks at the library
held books devoted to things you knew nothExcept for a trip to Atlanta, via Valparaiso
and Chicago, Charles Vandersee expects
to hang around Dogwood, Virginia, all
summer, trying to read and write.
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Because really, you know, this is
it. With today's solemn reproaches
about the university losing its way, its
sense of purpose, we need to smile
more-as we respectfully dissent. We
need to say with a matter-of-fact smile
that the university is about breathing,
about taking in air. Not, essentially,
about truth or character-forming or
jobs or national productivity, or rescuing the misshapen young from desperate parents, or even packaging and
delivering a worthy Great Books curriculum.
The university is a collection of
people joyously involved in breathing
and disclosing: people testing their
minds out of a "private passion for the
thing itself' (149). People publishing
because the books and articles they
need to use, often when teaching,
haven't yet been written.
Universities are collections of
people who want to know more, and
try to know more, and love talking
about what they know, and where
they're going next in their learning
about knowing, and therefore in need
of some individual quirky autonomy.
They will go on talking about wanting
to know, and trying, even as fiscally
desperate legislatures close the last
university gate-abandoning the public weal to prisons and asylums.
Society demonstrably is better
because of universities, and not only

because labs produce new vaccines.
It's an embarrassing secret, however,
as to why society benefits. I hear it
from alumni, that certain courses they
took at age 20, or books they read,
remembered at age 30 or 40, are what
keep them, these lawyers, marketeers,
able functionaries of all kinds, from
becoming raving misanthropes. You
know them too, next door, around the
corner. Society is fragile, white-collar
violence is barely in abeyance, and the
memory of a university, its books and
conversations and even courses, is
what keeps discontent from erupting
into terrible mayhem.
Mr. Schoyer, a corporate attorney, Harvard graduate: He had studied
something that had no direct bearing on the
clatter of coin. He was always the bemused
scholar, mild and democratic, posing us
children friendly questions as if Pittsburgh
or Paw Paw were Athens and he fully
expected to drag from our infant brains the
Pythagorean theorem ( 154) .
Without certain courses and
readings available then and now,
directed by scholars in universities who
love talking about what they know, we
would have not only cities in ashes but
suburbia a cocaine jungle. That's the
unutterable little secret, as the world
turns. Mr. Schoyer, who "majored in
classical literature and history,"
remembers his college exhilaration,
and now in the corporate world clings
to sanity by trying to make college students out of any kids available.
But in our time the passion for
knowledge is being attacked-seen as
a disguise for mere vanity, mere competition. This perverse view arises, I
do believe, because adults grow rude
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in their aging, disrespectfully forgetting the joy of children. They assume
that all or most professors and neurotic graduate students are incipient
Fausts. Whereas in fact we are much
more likely to be children like Annie
Dillard of Pittsburgh, cited in passages
above: driven to investigation, and disclosure, because we can't help perceiving the abundance around us, as yet
undisclosed, God's plenty.
Yes, it's Annie Dillard those page
numbers refer to , her memoir An
American Childhood: a novelist and
essayist gifted with remembering childhood intellectual passion, seeming to
rank it, as honesty must, at least on a
par with adult passions for gardening,
selling, parenting, or saving lost souls.
Her words express actual thoughts, not
dispirited gripes. She is no sociologist,
historian, theologian, editorialist, or
pundit, unamiably caricaturing the
university for not being a comfortable
old log with Virtue on one end and
Veritas on the other. Or that equally
flagrant caricature: scholars driven
mainly by fear of falling, publish or
perish.
One reason for this present intervention of mine is bewilderment. Too
many adults seem either too near or
too far from the academy, to see in
clear focus what seems to me self-evident: that the good things in life, and
very few bad, come from pursuit of
knowledge. In saying this I can't
endorse the distinction I've seen
made, between making knowledge and
discovering knowledge. It's the former
that's especially disparaged-we supposedly make gods of ourselves at the
university when we set about briskly to
create knowledge rather than humbly
find out what's already there, undisclosed.
I take for granted that both making and discovering are crucial parts of
what we do at universities, and that the
good things in life come from their
marriage, a wedlock based on love .
People at work making and discoverMay 1994

ing have found in creativity and imagination a deep capacity for caritas.
They form splendid little communitiestalismanic word that warms the
bosoms of dispirited moralists.
Families, clans, business task forces, ad
agencies, church councils-you name
them, none is an authentic kind of
community. Either you're born into
them , or you hook up with them to
perform prescribed duties. But
human authenticity comes when two
or more are gathered together in
Dillard's passion for pursuing disclosing, and then making something out
of what you get.
You thought you knew the place.
And you came together because you
didn't know it, but you wanted to, and
you and other people had rudimentary
maps, questions, and strong imaginings.
Moral reform, social bonds, justitia omnibus, nobility and virtue, global
serenity. I really would rather count
for these things, and imagination of
these things , on people who don't
know the place, but have a love of
wanting to know, than on people who
believe that desirable ends are best
secured by sitting down in task forces,
congresses, and other practical gatherings of ice water and yellow pads.
Which is why we have to say it
again and again, especially to people
long before they get to universities,
people about age ten. And to people
exiled from universities: all the cheerless graduates doomed to read and
ponder and seek disclosure only in
spare time, if at all. The world is more
full of eyeless children and exiles than
we imagine, all on violence's rough
threshold. There are hidden bomb
factories in the neighborhood: every
dwelling, every office.
At least Annie Dillard's parents
were not among the exiles or incendiaries . Annie, with her Christmas
microscope in the basement, stared
and stared and finally saw an amoeba.
She ran upstairs, where Mother was

smoking a Chesterfield and Father was
drinking coffee, tilted back in his
chair. "Mother regarded me warmly.
She gave me to understand that she
was glad I had found what I had been
looking for, but that she and Father
were happy to sit with their coffee, and
would not be coming down" ( 148).
This is a splendid scene. "She
[mother] did not say, but I began to
understand then, that you do what you
do out of your private passion for the
thing itself." Let's carve that, shall we,
on cornerstones and scrawl it on classroom walls.
But that was a special place,
Pittsburgh of old industrial and multiethnic wealth, and that was Annie, and
these were two shrewdly nurturing parents. How, to the rest of America's
places and people, do you convey the
cornerstone importance of private
intellectual passions, and the conviction that American universities have
quite successfully developed to serve
same, even though sometimes they do
unctiously clutter their agendas with
striving toward virtue, productivity,
public payoff, and self-lauding pedagogical reform?
Dillard discloses the sacredness
of the private: I had essentially been
handed my own life. In subsequent years
my parents would praise my drawings and
poems, and supply me with books, art supplies, and sports equipment, and listen to
my troubles and enthusiasms, and supervise my hours, and discuss and inform, but
they would not get involved with my detective work, nor hear about my reading, nor
inquire about my homework or term papers
or exams, nor visit the salamanders I
caught, nor listen to me play the piano, nor
attend my field hockey games, nor fuss over
my insect collection with me. . . . My days
and nights were my own to plan and fill
( 149).
I am very glad that a student in
my undergraduate seminar this spring
mentioned this book, An American
Childhood, which I'd heard of often but
never read. Kate, this student, supplied
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me, the way Annie's parents did. Not
literally, since it came from the library,
but the point is that the university
every day is the place where we listen
to enthusiasms-where private intellectual passions intersect, where we
supply each other bits of maps toward
disclosing, and in so doing reach out
to each other and to the unknown, a
calisthenic that no other populist
human institution attempts.
No one is required, at the university in Dogwood, to enroll in a two-year
prescribed sequence of courses in
American Studies. But fifteen a year
do enroll, because of a nascent intellectual passion. Long before the end
of their two years, in the semester
before graduation, they have formed a
noisy and comfortable community,
and sense of mutual responsibility, an
ease in each other's company that
enhances the climate of learning.
Their intersections with mine this
semester we happen to be calling a
seminar on American Exceptionalism.
Like American parents, university
and college teachers need not be
involved in their students' salamanders
or games or collections. But shouldn't
they be passionate about their own
worms and lizards, and maps toward
disclosing, and be willing to talk with
excitement in luminous language?
And wonder of wonders, this is
what universities are, quite often
indeed, not just what they might be:
collections of such folk, formed into
communities by Internet, by scholarly
conferences, by journals, by books, by
after-class banter and disclosure, by
the passions that produce communication in many formats. But people who,
poor in spirit, blind themselves to disclosure-people who are not currently
breathing and do not crave air-will
not be able to see all this.
Annie was well along to understanding this; I'm afraid, though, that
her joy, like some wines, travels poorly,
and that we're in an age of sackcloth
and vinegar, public irritability, and
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even self-contempt within the professoriat. The next time you see a book or
magazine article or op-ed column
angry and misshapen about universities, turn for heaven's sake and sanity
to your insect collection instead.
Next fall semester starts my 30th
year in higher education-or 38th, if
you count undergraduate and graduate-school years. A good time to reiterate truths such as those thus far, which
probably can actually be called Truth,
since the university is the human institution most congruent with the will of
the God of Judaism and Christendom,
that we all be saved and adore Him
forever.
God after all is all
Knowledge-the very earliest and justly most bracing of biblical disclosures,
in the shape of the Tree that Dillard
alludes to. Knowledge is power and
glory, to be adored as identical with its
Maker.
You apparently need knowledge
before you can arrive at faith, hope,
and charity: knowledge of the
inevitable obstacles to faith and the
resources for coping. Knowledge
about a great many aspects of the
world-human psychology, international economics, climate and agriculture-as you seek sound decisions
regarding how much hope you allow
yourself, and judge what acts deserve
to be called caritas.
In a university you need also, of
course, humility, the driving force
implied in Annie Dillard's rhapsody
on childlike enthusiasm. Lacking that
gift, by all means undertake editorial
writing or evangelism.
To think about universities, you
need a sense of humor and a sense of
your nation's folkways, rather than a
longing for the universities of the
Middle Ages, or the university of
Cardinal Newman, or the idealized
Athens-in-Chicago of Allan Bloom. A
folkway of your own American nation,
for example, is the liaison meroeilleuse
offootball stadia with remnants of classical paideia. Also the unembarrassed
yearning of American undergraduates

for growth and getting along, rather
than disclosure. Also the fretful-and
gassy and humorless-delusion that
society will become more sturdy if universities concentrate on perfecting
cores, canons, and classroom technolo-

gy.
American research universities are the
envy of the world, unlike our health care
system, the criminal justice system, or secondary school system. . . . I'm not particularly interested in getting our research
universities in closer touch with other parts
of the culture or society. I'm not sure we
need a closer relationship to the marketplace. . . . I certainly don't want us to get
closer to the culture of the undergraduate
students. . . . I take our fundion to be to
confuse them lJy presenting them with a culture they have never seen before. We don't
want to assimilate to theirs, we want to
attempt to assimilate them to ours.
That's not Annie Dillard on the
culture of disclosure but philosopher/gadfly Richard Rorty, at the university in Dogwood, at a conference on
"teaching, learning, and research at a
public university," held here last
February. He, like Annie, has it about
right, and what he says applies pretty
much as well to colleges and universities only marginally "research" institutions. Pursuit of disclosure mea!ls
excitedly presenting all American students with "a culture they have never
seen before."
Now, as I've said, we need to
print up cards, fliers, broadsides, and
leaflets, and with big smiles proclaim
that culture. In universities we not
only haven't lost our way, we still have
the only way. As Annie says, you have
to have air, and you have to have
space, to live, and that's what we're
talking about when we're talking about
universities.

From Dogwood, wishing you a summer
offresh air,

c.v.
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Letter from Washington:
Sacrifice and Violence
Jon Pahl

Is the violence of American culture religiously legitimized? I've
recently returned from a semester in
Washington, D.C., where, along with
more traditional research, I joined the
masses on the mall during the rituals
of Veterans Day (November 11) .
Contrary to rumors about a "culture of
disbelief," I came away with the distinct impression that American civil
religion was thriving. I also carne away
with a disturbing question: is the religious piety in evidence at the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial anything more
than worship of the old nationalistic
war god, Mars, who demands blood
sacrifice and whose cult is built upon
heaps of victims' bodies?
An estimated two hundred thousand pilgrims, most of them veterans,
many in military garb, gathered to
Jon Pahl, of the VU Department of
Theology, spmt last fall at Luther Institute,
as the first Institute Scholar in Residence,
working on a project involving violence and
religion in American life.
May 1994

dedicate the new women's statue on
the grounds of the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial. It was a crisp but clear day
as we filled the mall in the shadow of
the Lincoln Memorial. Chaplain Alice
Farquhar-Mayes of St. Luke's Medical
Center, Boise, Idaho-who had served
as a nurse in Vietnam between 1967
and 1971-offered the invocation.
She prayed: "God of light and God of
darkness, God of all creation, we dare
to proclaim and claim your presence
here among us. We dare to claim this
as holy ground, holy because you are
here, holy because we are here."
Farquhar-Mayes' prayer was,
apparently, answered. Students from
the Luther Institute in Washington
helped me to distribute to pilgrims a
survey, the first item of which read:
"The Vietnam memorial is a sacred
place, and should be treated as such."
Ninety-four percent agreed. But
sacred places are not always salutary, as
George Mosse's fine study of German
war memorials between World War I
and II, Fallen Soldiers, demonstrates.
Does, then, the sacred place that is the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial promote
holiness, or a fetish-like, fiercely-defensive attachment to the place (and in
this case, symbolically, to the nation?)
Farquhar-Mayes ended her invocation with a prayer for peace: "to
declare without equivocation that all
war is appalling and abhorrent to You
and to each of us here gathered."
That prayer was received with a long
silence, broken only when the Air
Force band struck up a rendition of
"She's A Grand Old Flag"(a musical
interlude not listed on the program).
The juxtaposition of religious and military symbols was jarring, and the dissonance may be unresolvable: did this
prayer promote pacifism-clearly its
intent-or was it overwhelmed by the
blaring brass band? The survey suggested an answer: only sixteen percent
of pilgrims felt that the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial "motivates me
toward pacifism." Seventy-six percent
agreed that the memorial is "a powerful symbol in the cause of national
unity."

In any event, the line between
God and country seemed blurry. A
number of events geared to members
of faith traditions took place as part of
the official activities. On the first day,
approximately five hundred Catholics
attended mass at the Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, where photos
of eight military women who died in
Vietnam surrounded the altar. The
National Conference of Vietnam
Veterans Ministers-with membership
from across America's religions-sponsored a number of other panel discussions, workshops, and services of
healing. Christians were involved in
intentional ways in this civil-religious
celebration; this was not an event
presided over only by governmental
priests. It was hard to tell whether we
were worshipping Mars or the Messiah,
the god of war or the Prince of peace.
According to several challenging
works by Stanford anthropologist Rene
Girard-notably Violence and the Sacred,
The Scapegoat, and Things Hidden Since
the Foundation of the World- the religious symbols at the wall fuel the tendency of our culture to solve problems
by violence. Girard's work is complex,
but at its core is a hypothesis that the
religious phenomena of "sacrifice" and
"scapegoating" legitimize violence.
Some veterans I observed clearly had
their scapegoats. Jane Fonda was hung
in effigy by one zealous group.
President Clinton was the butt of
countless slurs for his opposition to
the war, and was "court-martialed" in a
mock trial by one group. Even VicePresident Gore, himself a Vietnam veteran, was heckled by one loud vet who
accused the administration of hiding
information about MIAs and POWs.
The most troubling of the scapegoats at the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial is also the most obvious. No
memorial to the two million
Vietnamese killed in Vietnam has yet
been built. Furthermore, the old
racial stereotypes of persecution which
fueled the violence of Vietnam fade
from our culture with difficulty.
Several of my students asked a group
of vets whether the United States
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----....------------------ -----should normalize diplomatic and economic relations with Vietnam, and
were told that we should have nothing
to do with "gooks." Although the
administration has since November
decided to normalize relations with
Vietnam, the possibility remains that
we may find another Asian enemy to
scapegoat and on whom to vent our
violence. North Korea (whose enemy
status will conveniently be remembered in the soon-to-be-completed
Korean War Memorial) seems the
most likely candidate at present.
"Sacrifice" has also become one
of the key themes at the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial. The inscription
on the wall (added against Maya Lin's
objection) reads in part: "Our nation
remembers the courage, sacrifice, and
devotion to duty and country of its
Vietnam veterans." Earlier this year, at
the ground breaking for the women's
statue, Gen. Colin Powell invoked the
"sacrifices" of women who served in
Vietnam no less than five times in a
three minute address. Last year, at the
tenth anniversary of the dedication of
"the wall," Major General Edward Baca
declared to cheering listeners that
"[Vietnam] represented democracy
against communism . You know you
were part of a decisive victory in a
much larger war . ... Because of your
sweat and because of your sacrifice,
today communism is dead, dead,
dead."
Clearly something is dead at the
wall, but it isn't communism . The
Baca quote, Colin Powell's speech, the
inscription on the wall, and, most
notably, the "three men" statue (built
under pressure from Ross Perot and
veterans concerned that the wall was
not "heroic" enough) all attempt to
use the theme of "sacrifice" to revise
the history of an undeclared, divisive
conflict into a glorious ideological victory. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial
becomes Rambo in bronze and granite.
Nevertheless, perhaps contrary to
Girard, I think the way the Memorial
functions depends largely upon the
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beliefs one brings to it. In other
words, the diversity and voluntarism of
America's religions may help prevent
the wall from legitimizing violence.
For instance, most pilgrims did not
share the tendency of a few veterans to
scapegoat people who had opposed
the war. Fifty-two percent disagreed
with a statement that "people who
opposed the Vietnamese conflict
should stay away from the Memorial. "
Only twenty-eight p e rcent agreed.
Twenty percent were neutral. And, no
matter what pilgrims feel, anyone is
free to visit the wall. While the
Memorial thus can be used to promote
scapegoating, it invites forgiveness .
Voluntarism diffuses religiouslyinspired violence.
Also, while to use the religious
term "sacrifice" for military deaths
obviously cloaks and justifies the violence of war in euphemism, most pilgrims also bring with them resources
that link the theme of "sacrifice" to a
tradition deeper than that of the
nation's alone . In other words, pilgrims were not unanimously in support of the national mythology of
sacrifice to defeat communists that justified the war in the first place. Only
thirty-five percent agreed that "the
Vietnam conflict was part of a larger,
and ultimately successful, war on communism ." Forty-thre e percent disagreed with this statement, and
thirty-one percent of the total indicated very strong disagreement. Clearly,
ideological and spiritual issues remain
unresolved from this episode in
American history. Far from being a
cause for concern, this is a source of
potential hope: when the Memorial
serves to stimulate debate it cannot be
co-opted by any one ideological faction, or used to prop up a weak and
illegitimate regime. I hope in my continuing research to investigate the role
of traditional religious traditions and
beliefs (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish) in
shaping attitudes toward the Vietnam
era and Memorial. Religious diversity
and freedom may diffuse the te ndency
of religions to legitimize n ationalistic
violence.

Finally, another source of hope is
the presence of what might be called
an individualistic version of liberation
theology which informed many, if not
most, of the rituals and speeches at the
Memorial. The women's statue itselfthree nurses and a wounded soldieris designed to represent compassion
for a victim. It also redresses the overwhelming patriarchy of our other
national monuments. Furthermore,
despite the overwhelming military
regalia on display, the day was not as
martial as it was humane. People
wept. Pilgrims expressed pain, and
received comfort. Most seemed to
believe that God sided with the
oppressed, in this case with the victims
and the survivors of the war; the survey
demonstrated unanimous support for
"veterans' rights." It may be typical of
American culture that most pilgrims
were unable to move this identification
with victims into a critical attitude
toward social structures, power, and
policies: less than half felt that the
memorial "reminded me of the lies of
our leaders. " Thirty percent objected
strongly to the statement.
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial
thus functions at present as a sacred
place (it is now the most visited site in
the capital) whose meaning is being
made by the pilgrims who visit it and
the leade rs who use it. To confront
the 58,000 names on the wall is to face
death. To recognize the presence of
pilgrims who leave gifts, convinced
they can "touch" those lives again, may
be to face resurrection. Journeying
through the valley of the shadow that
is the Memorial, an individual can
come to understand in a new way the
presence of evil in human history and
the power of love to affirm life beyond
and despite the suffering evil causes.
Mars need not take over the mall. But
a contest for meaning is underway,
between those voices which side with
victims and speak of abhorring war
and seeking peace, and those voices
which would forget the victims and
glory in sacrifice, blood, and victory. 0
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A Touch of Pentecost
Youthful, in her late twenties, a flushed and birdlike woman
had been moved into the hospital room's second bed
when l arrived to visit my daughter, who bathed behind a curtain.
Waiting, I said I'd sit outside the white billows.
My book was already opened when the woman asked:
"Are you a Catholic?" I looked up. Beyond the woman,
two hunched visitors in black crone dresses
rose, then gestured; words in a sharp sounding language,
flurries rocked back and forth in the small room,
until the two crowded me, nodding back to her.
"My aunts," the woman said," ... from Albania." Her hand
curved to signify them. "They speak hello .... Do you believe,
your face is nice, in confession?" I said, "Catholic,
no, but confession-! have always thought it
a good idea." She told me a lie was killing her,
and that her toes had been reattached to her left foot
days before. "A lie is a sin," she said,
"but to save someone, is it wrong? I need a priest,
but I tell you. When I say it, I think my brother-in-law
will lose our checks from welfare, so I say to police
that I did it-and, true, my fault was there1 walked in front when he mowed." "But surely there is no sin
in survival," I said. I reached for her hand. But just then
my daughter opened the curtain and the doctor came in.
Her aunts spoke, perhaps asked what had been said;
one aunt turned to me as a sunflower might turn
to even a hint of daylight. A peach. She took a peach
from her pocket, put it in my hand. The other pulled a bag
from the closet. Carrots, radishes, avocados, tomatoes:
my arms filled. "Please, you must go," the doctor said,
not unkindly, as the aunts decorated my daughter's bed
with fruit. Caught in this bluster, he lifted the sheeting
pitched at the bed's end, looked at the woman's foot,
said, "Tomorrow. Do you hear me? These will have to be removed.
Early." Then I remember the women were as blindingly
quick, as bizarre and at the same time as beautiful
as funnel clouds-aunts tucking little grape clusters
around my daughter's pillow and in her robe-down the sleeves,
the long cowl of the neckline; my cheek touched, fast,
by a hand papery as a moth's wing passing;
the woman twisting to a bedside table, opening a drawer,
insisting we take cucumbers, a mango, plantains.
"Thank you, thank you," we kept saying:
I wondered how they had become the people that I saw they were,
as if the gift of tongues were in their hands.

Pat James

Endings
Arvid F. Sponberg
On Easter Sunday afternoon, my
wife, our daughter, and I saw
Schindler's List. I refer you to Rick
Barton's review in the March Cresset for
an assessment of the movie's plot,
characters, and virtues. I want only to
add a nickel's worth to the justifiably
extensive commentary attaching itself
to Steven Spielberg's masterpiece. It is
an appropriate movie to see at Easter,
perhaps even a little better suited to
Good Friday. It is a movie about salvation through resurrection from
despair and certain death.
It is a salutary movie for
Christians to see because the
Christians disappear while most of the
Jews are slaughtered and a few are
saved. The movie ought to remind
every Christian who sees it of the
moral and intellectual perversions that
resulted from 1900 years of vengeanceGus Sponberg writes Campus Diary for
The Cresset, edits a newsletter of
American theatre studies, and is completing
a casebook of playwright A. R Gurney. The
VU students mentioned in this column were
killed in an auto accident in February,
1994, returning to campus from a clinical
assignment.
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seeking by Christians for the death of
Jesus.
Spielberg alludes directly to
Christianity only by setting two brief
scenes in elaborate cathedrals. In the
first, near the beginning of the film,
Schindler evades Nazi laws against
doing business with Jews by concluding a deal with three Jewish businessman while all four pretend to participate in Mass. In the second, near the
end, Schindler takes a seat behind his
estranged wife and, leaning forward,
whispers a vow of faithfulness to her, a
vow which, a subtitle implies a few
minutes later, he did not keep.
Apart from these fleeting references, Spielberg depicts not the slightest glimmer of help from the Christian
society surrounding the Jews of
Cracow. They are forsaken and part of
the film's lasting achievement is the
commemoration of forsakenness that
leaves no choice except to stake everything-possessions, family, safety,
humanity itself-on a savior.
Spielberg's direction compounds
ironies that I won't enumerate here
but that ought to make any reflective
Christian writhe with shame and sorrow.
As I say, it's an appropriate movie
for Good Friday, when we fancy that
had we stood at the foot of the cross
we would have been of the company of
John, and Mary, and Joseph of
Arimathea. But we are of the company
of Peter and Judas and, though it was
not his purpose, Spielberg does us an
inestimable service by telling a story
that makes us feel what Peter and
Judas must have felt.
0
It's hardly ever conducive to a
settled mind to think closely about the
conventions of your profession.
Thoughts of mores and rituals always
thrust sharply into the foreground
their irrefutable arbitrariness while
shrinking fuzzily in the background
their
undeniable
practicality.
Sometimes, in the interval, say,
between back-to-hack classes, when

you're hunched over a cup of facultylounge decaf, and staring through an
icy window into the gray/white void of
a February Hoosier snowscape, then
the little doubts that prick the fine
skin of your pedagogy may suddenly
plunge into a nerve.
"I didn't really want to take this
course," she had said, "but I needed
the credits. And it fit my schedule."
"Your attendance has been sporadic," I replied.
"I just want to do well enough to
graduate in May."
Credits. Schedules. Requirements.
Graduations.
These are conventions no professor should think about at too great a
length. It's also probably a good idea
to stay off the committees we maintain
to regulate them. Some things should
be taken for granted. Thinking about
them is like trying to examine the
inside of your own eye. What once
seemed stable and transparent now
appears as a Brownian field of colloidal particles. And you can't see any
better after the examination than you
did before.
Ask yourself, "Why do we package knowledge in credits?" Ask yourself, ''Why are courses in different subjects organized to meet the same number of minutes per week for the same
number of weeks?" Ask yourself,
"What relation do requirements for,
say, nursing certification have to the
deaths of three nursing students and
the injury of two others on their way to
campus from clinicals?"
The fulfilling of requirements,
the pursuit of degrees, the maintenance of schedules, the earning of
credits-for that is the work that
Kimberly Pressel ( t), Jill Rosko ( t),
Laura K. Vandyke ( t), Adrienne
Lynch and Julie Brumm were about on
February 24-are not commensurate
with the loss of their lives, except, perhaps, in arbitrariness. They who were
purposeful and hopeful now vanish to
be replaced-no, never replaced-to
be subtended by absence, wounds, and
griefs.
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And I cannot escape wondering
whether some other arrangement of
their work might have brought them
to a different end. Could their pursuit
of knowledge have. been conductedthe ground of their learning have
been prepared-in a manner so that
the journey of their minds would have
continued, evading for some further
time the dreadful conclusions?
But this is all foolishness. What
possible connection is there-reallybetween the rituals of our professions
and the lives of our students? None.
Absolutely none. Right?
In the first act of David Mamet's
latest play, Oleanna, a professor of education tries to explain to a student that
the beliefs buttressing higher education have become social creeds
thoughtlessly appropriated and bear
no necessary relation to the conduct of
life:

taste to mock and destroy. But you should
question it, professor. And you pick those
things which you feel advance you: publication, tenure, and the steps to get them you
call "harmless rituals." And you perform
those steps. Although you say it is
hypocrisy. But to the aspirations of your
students. Of hardworking students, who
come here, who slave to come here -you
have no idea what it cost me to come to
this school-you mock us. You call education "hazing," and from your so-protected,
so-elitist seat you hold our confusion as a
joke, and our hopes and efforts with it.
Then you sit there and say "what have I
done?" And ask me to understand that you
have aspirations too. But I tell you. I tell
you. That you are vile. And that you are
exploitative. And if you possess one ounce
of that inner honesty you describe in your
book, you can look in yourself and see
those things that I see. And you can find
revulsion equal to my own. (33)

Somebody told you, and you
hold it as an article of faith, that higher
education is an unassailable good. This
notion is so dear to you that when I question it you become angry. Good. Good, I
say. Are not those the very things which we
should question? I say college education,
since the war, has become so a matter of
course, and such a fashionable necessity,
for those either of or aspiring to the new
vast middle class that we espouse it, as a matter of right, and have ceased to ask, "What
is it good for?" (Dramatists Play Service,
23. Emphasis Mamet's)

I am confident, and I hope justifiably, that I am a better teacher than
Mamet's professor. I do not mock the
aspirations of my students (nor do I
know anyone here who does) and I do
not consider education to be a form of
hazing. On the contrary, though I
agree with Mamet's professor that too
few students ask "What is education
good for?", I would not teach another
minute if I did not believe that education can help people learn how to live
and how to achieve worth both for others and themselves. Yet the words of
Mamet's student make me feel that I
ought to know more than I do about
what it costs students to come to my
school. I ought to consider better than
I do the costs of what I ask of students
in their pursuit of knowledge as measured in schedules, controlled by
requirements, assessed in credits, and
celebrated in graduations. For as we
have reason to remember in this
Spring term of 1994, the costs can be
high. 0

john:

The student, who identifies herself as coming from a different background than the professor's, doesn't
understand this attitude. In the second
act, she counterattacks:
Carok You say that higher education is a joke. And treat it as such, you treat
it as such. And confess to a taste to play the
Patriarch in your class. To grant this. To
deny that . ... You confess. You love the
Power. To deviate. To invent, to transgress .
.. to transgress whatever norms have been
established for us. And you think it's
charming to "question" in yourself this
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0. John Eldred, Women Pastors: If God
Calls, Why not the Church? Valley Forge:
Judson Press, 1981.
Hmmm, I thought, on being
asked to review this little volume-a
book published a dozen years agomight we not be better off to explore
some of the more recent thinking taking shape in Anglican, Roman, or
Lutheran circles, rather than looking
at these issues through Baptist eyes?
Then I read the book.
It is, of course, always a pleasure
to find someone who echoes many of
one's own sentiments. For some time
in my own writing and teaching I have
stressed the fact that a fundamental
problem in my church body (the
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod) and
in those others that do not have
female pastors is not the absence of
ordination for women. Without question, that lack of partnership before
the altar and in the pulpit is troublesome for many, both women and men,
as it seems not to fit with what we know
to be true about ourselves as baptized
members together in the Body of
Christ. However, I wrote recently, ordination is no panacea, since there are
church bodies where people in clerical
collars stiii face limitations if they happen to be female rather than male.
0. John Eldred, a pastor in the
American Baptist Churches in the
U.S.A., writes from a tradition in which
women have long been ordained into
33

the ministry, but in which women still
lack equal opportunities to serve in the
church. A great many congregations
simply will not consider calling women
to be their pastors, and a disproportionate number of ordained clergywomen are confined to positions in
music, Christian education, or youth
work-that is, if they can find professional employment at all. Eldred
restates most of the arguments heard
through the centuries and still prevalent today, assuring us that Baptist
women in priestly frocks have much in
common with Catholic or LCMS or
other women who have never had the
hands of preachers or bishops laid on
their heads.
The author has two main themes:
(a) The Apparent Reasons and (b)
The Underlying Reasons why,
although God calls, the church does
not. The first section covers competency, change, competition, and the theological challenge. The other includes
the origin of resentment, the problem
of human sexuality, the issue of marital status, and what he calls the question of honesty (this in reference to
the church's responsiveness to God's
plan for a "new creation").
Eldred takes seriously the biblical
record-all of it. He would have us
examine the old covenant law and the
new one of grace, subjecting every portion of the Scriptures to the relationship God established with humanity
through the person of Jesus Christ. At
the same time he recognizes that distortions in understanding and interpreting the sacred word have come
about through human culture. Given
the undisputable "maleness" of most
thinking, studying, and decision making throughout history, it is not surprising, he says, that stereotypes and
myths about feminine abilities and
callings should be ingrained in both

0 Dot Nuechterlein teaches sociology
at VU, and edits Voices and Visions.
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church and society. To perpetuate
those traditions and to continue to
prevent women from following Christ's
command to be his witnesses, however,
is to deny the pattern of inclusiveness
and equality demonstrated throughout
his own ministry.
Speaking of sin, Women Pastors
discusses frankly the problems the
church has always had in dealing with
sexuality. Somewhere along the way,
religious leaders bought into the idea
that sex = sin, and that the female, as
temptress, is the originator of carnality. Of course that little episode in the
Garden lies at the heart of the problem, but Augustine and Aquinas, who
leapfrogged over Jesus' example of
equal treatment for the sexes and
returned to Old Testament notions of
super- and subordination, bear responsibility as well. Eldred describes what
happened as "the satanization of both
women and sexuality," as the church
restored the framework in which
woman became once more a sex
object.
It is difficult to say it out loudand I have been verbally slapped for
doing so-but this is what underlies
much of the "doctrine" in my own
church body. American women today
have a great deal of experience in
dealing with sex objectification, and
we recognize it when we see/hear/feel
it. What confronts us within the
parameters of the church is the fact
that Female is our primary label,
superseding Baptized, Redeemed,
Sanctified, or Gifted. What matters
above all in the life of the church
seems to be that we are created as Notmen, different from the "norm," and
thus preassigned to a separate, "appropriate" sphere of service, no matter
what our individual abilities, interests,
and convictions. When we complain,
church leaders tell us their hands are
tied and naturally they can do nothing
to change what God Himself instituted-which also means that by objecting we are really rebelling against the

Lord, because He made us this way.
The author continually brings
the focus back to Christ's rejection of a
double standard for men and women.
Jesus spoke with women directly, in
contrast to the accepted Jewish protocol; taught them theological truths
without the benefit of male intermediaries; and commissioned several of
them face-to-face to carry his message
to men, including the fact that he had
risen from the grave in that second
Garden. Eldred goes so far as to suggest that the females Christ called into
his fellowship were more faithful than
the male disciples-the women stayed
at Golgotha to the end and helped to
bury the body, whereas the men
betrayed him, denied him, and fled!
The book concludes with several
practical suggestions. The churches in
all denominations should make the
question of women in ministry a primary concern. Working together, as
they have in addressing such matters
as racial injustice and world hunger,
would promote significant consciousness-raising and potential change.
Rather than regarding women as the
problem, churches should realize that
men have suppressed conflict over this
issue for many years, and women today
are simply revealing what has been
long hidden. Seminary curricula and
continuing pastoral education programs should provide opportunities
for both men and women to study the
theology, psychology, and sociology of
women in ministry. In turn, congregations everywhere should conduct study
campaigns on the topic so that people
begin to recognize and lay aside their
misconceptions and fears about
females as pastors.
It seems to me they could begin
by reading this book.
Dot Nuechterlein
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